Third Battle of Komárom (1849)

In the Second Battle of Komárom from 2 July 1849, the commander of the Army of the Northern Danube, General Artúr Görgei, suffered a serious head injury, as a result of which he was lying unconscious until 4 July, between life and death.[5] Before the battle of 2 July, as a result of a misunderstunding between him and the Governor-President of Hungary Lajos Kossuth, the latter removed him from the position of the main commandement of the Hungarian main army, appointing in his place Lieutenant General Lázár Mészáros, but the message with this decision arrived to Komárom only after the battle.[6]

Portrait of György Klapka

Julius von Haynau

Major General György Klapka, who, as senior officer was replacing the temporarily unconscious Görgei, a meeting of the Hungarian officers, presenting them Kossuth's decision, but the Hungarian officers protested, affirming their loyality towards Görgei, and they sent Klapka and General József Nagysándor to the capital, to express the armies support to Görgei, and their opposition to Kossuth's decision in th ministry council. As a result of their resolution, the ministry council held at 5 July ordered to the Army of the Northern Danube, to retreat from Komárom, and to march towards South, but allowed Görgei to remain in the lead of the army until they fulfill this task. The ministry council also authorized the Army of the Northern Danube to make a Reconnaissance-in-force on the right shore of the Danube against the imperial forces, stipulating to the Hungarian army to retreat towards Szeged even if they score a victory.[7]

On 6 July in the military council held at Komárom, the officers argued on which shore of the Danube to retreat the Hungarian army towards Pest. Görgei who, despite being convalescent, was present in the council, proposed a Hungarian attack at 9 July against the forces of Field Marshall Julius Jacob von Haynau on the Southern shore of the Danube, and this was accepted by the council.[8] But in the next day, Klapka, without informing Görgei, ordered to the I Corps led by Nagysándor, to strat their march towards Pest. Hearing about this, Görgei resigned as a protest against this decision, but the council of the officers convinced him to take back the leadership of the army, and they convinced Klapka as well to revoke his order about sending the I Corps to the capital.[9] These events caused a delay in the implementation of the attack planned to 9 July, so the Hungarians decided to attack at 11 July, also hoping with this to lull the Austrians vigilance. Instead of the still convalescent Görgei, Klapka was appointed to lead the attack of the Hungarian army.[10]

In the fortcoming battle the Hungarians were numerically in a better situation than in the earlier battle from 2 July, in which the Hungarians (26 796 soldiers and 131 cannons) led by Görgei repulsed the two times more numerous (52 185 soldiers and 234 cannons) imperial army led by Haynau.[11] After the aforementioned battle the I corps led by General József Nagysándor and the detachment of Ármin Görgey, which until then were guarding North-West Hungary, arrived in Komárom, rising the size of Klapka's troops to 43 347 soldiers and 180 cannons, while Haynau had at his disposition 56 787 soldiers and 242 cannons.[12] Haynau's troops could had been more numerous than this if he would had not sent the III corps westwards towards Buda, only the Wolf brigade remaining from this corps at Mocsa, on the South-Western edge of the future battlefield.[13] Haynau expected a Hungarian attack, from the Austrian reconnaissance of the enemy troops.[14]

The Hungarian battleplan was that the three Hungarian army corps which planned to march away from Komárom towards the concentration point of the Hungarian armies around Szeged (the I., III. and VII. corps), together with the II. and VIII. corps appointed to remain after the battle in the fortress of Komárom, had to attack the imperial army, which was encircling from East and South East the fortress, trying to reach the Bicske-Győr road at Nagyigmánd. If they managed to break through the Austrian defence lines, the II. and VIII corps had to retreat to the fortress, while the other three had to continue their march towards Szeged.[15] As main objectives of the battle were: seizing the line of the Concó river, and to reach the main road from Győr to Bicske at Nagyigmánd.[16] The attack had to start at 7.30 a.m. on the right wing by the VII corps, supported by the Janik division from the VIII. and Rakovszky division frm the II. corps, as well by the provisional Pikéthy cavalry division.[17] They had to break through the Austrians through the Ács woods, while the cavalry division had to encircle the woods from the left, and to push the enemy over the Concó river.[18] The III corps had to attack at 8.00 a.m., bypassing from the left the trenches from Csém, and to occupy Nagyigmánd and the main road from Győr to Bicske.[19] In the same time the I corps had to occupy Mocsa, advance on the road to Tata and to Tömöd, keeping, through detachments the connection with the III corps. Behind the I and III corps the Görgey-detachment had to be the reserve.[20] The Esterházy division deployed to the left flank had only the task of demonstration.[21]

Before the battle Haynau's troops were positioned as it follows. The I corps led by General Franz Schlik constituted the left flank, with the Ács woods held by the Schneider brigade, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the Reischach Brigade, between the village Ács and the Ács forest near the Danube, north to the country road the stationed the Bianchi Brigade, South to that the Ludwig cavalry brigade, behind the Bianchi Brigade, on the other bank of the Concó river, at the northwestern edge of Ács, stood the Sartori Brigade, the rest of the Reischach brigade held the Herkály waste. From the IV corps near the Concó river stood the Benedek brigade, and the Herzinger division held the Csém waste. From the III corps the Wolf brigade and the Bechtold cavalry division held Mocsa. The Russian Panyutyin division stationed at Nagy- and Kisigmánd, while the Austrian artillery reserve stood at Újmajor between Nagyigmánd and Ács.[22]

As seen before Klapka planned the Hungarian attack to July 11 7.30 a.m., but he had to delay it for several hours. Although the original order was that the I corps had to cross the Danube and spend the night in the entrenched camp from the right bank of the Danube, for an unknown reason they crossed the river only next day in the morning, delaying the start of the battle.[23] In the morning of 11 July it was a thick fog, followed by rain, which caused the reserve ammunition stockpile to remain behind.[24] For the troops this long waiting had a demoralizing effect.[25] Finally the Hungarian units started to march towards the enemy positions only around 9.00 a.m.[26]

The wounded and still convalescent General Görgei followed the battle with binoculars from the Star Trench (Csillagsánc) of Komárom, as a simple spectator.[27]

The first Hungarian troops who departed towards the battlefield was the I corps, which had to make the greatest distance, then the III corps, followed by the Pikéthy cavalry division, and finally the VII and VIII corps started to march.[28] The first gun shots were heard East from Ószőny, when the Esterházy division saw the enemy troops at the sugar factory from Füzítő. The Hungarians chased away the Austrian wanguards, occupying the place with two guns and one or two battalions, then taking control over the Almás waste.[29]

Battle of Komárom at 11 July 1849

Two divisions of the Hungarian VIII. corps led by Ferenc Aschermann advanced through the wineyards from Szőny and the to Lovad towards the Meggyfa-erdő (Cherry Forrest), in the same time the VII corps led by General Ernő Poeltenberg entered in the Ács woods, forcing the I corps troops General Franz Schlik to retreat behind the forrest.[30] Schlik tried to reorganize the retreating troops, and brought new brigades in support. When Field Marshall Haynau received the news about the Hungarian shootings around 11:30, ordered to the reserve (IV) corps led by Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth to occupy the heights from the Herkály waste, and to the Russian division commanded by Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin to march towards Csémpuszta (Csém waste). Around 12:30 Haynau arrived to the Herkály heights, to take up the command.[31]

Third battle of Komárom 11 júli 1849

The Jablonowski-brigade from the IV corps arrived, and fought heroically against the VII corps, with a battalion trying to hold the lines at the woods, while its other units defended Herkálypuszta (Herkály waste).[32] The Ludwig cavalry brigade of the Austrian I corps advanced between the Ács woods and the Herkály waste, coming face to face with the Hungarian Pikéthy cavalry division, but the latter, instead of attacking them, started to shoot them with their artillery, thus failing to fulfill their objective to push back the Austrian cavalry.[33] Wohlgemuth ordered the Herzinger division from his I corps to attack Pikéthy's batteries from left, but right when the division was preparing to attack on the heights North to the Csém waste, they were attacked from the right by the III Hungarian corps led by General Leiningen, routed, and chasen back towards the Csém waste.[34] If in this moment Pikéthy would had ordered an attack, the whole left flank of the Austrian army would had been in great danger, but he did nothing. General József Nagysándor, commanding the I Hungarian corps, remained at the Ószőny wineyards, entering in an artillery duel with the Bechtold cavalry division of the I Austrian corps, instead of advancing level with the III corps of Leiningen, exploiting Herzinger's rout.[35]

Map of the third battle of Komárom from 11 July 1849

This gave time to the latter to reorganize his troops between the Herkály and the Csém waste, and led by Wohlgemuth in person, they counterattacked.[36] Leiningen too led his troops personally against the Herzinger division, but the devastating fire of the concentrated batteries of the IV. corps put them in disorder, so the Hungarian III corps retreated. The Hungarian main commander of this battle, General Klapka ordered his reserve batteries to advance to the III corps, and respond to Wohlgemuth's guns, so a harsh artillery duel started with the participation of 140 cannons, which lasted an hour, giving to Leiningen time to reorganize his infantry.[37] This was the moment when the right flank of the Panyutyin's Russian division positioned around a farm from the Csém waste, and the Simbschen brigade from the Bechtold division, positioned at the right wing of the Russians, attacked the too advanced Hungarian III corps, threatening it with encirclement. Leiningen resisted to this attack for a while, but seing that the danger of being outflanked by the right wing of the Russians and Simbschen's brigade, is imminent, he finally ordered the retreat, which, at the beginning, was done in order, but when his troops were hit by the enemy artillery from three sides, his lines almost fell in disorder, being saved from a rout by the fact that the Russians renounced to the pursuit. So Leiningen had time to reorganize his troops again.[38]

After this the Hungarian I. corps, and the Esterházy division positioned between Ószőny and Dunaalmás, retreated, being covered by the cavalries of the III. and the I. corps, repelling the attacks of the Bechtold cavalry division.[39]

On the right flank the VIII and the VII corps led by Aschermann and Poeltemberg, were in a harsh engagement with the Austrians, but little by little the infantry of the VII corps led by Poeltemberg was slowly pushed back from the Ács and the Cherry forrests by the I corps of Franz Schlik, despite the fact that, prior to that, the battalions of the VII corps charged three times against the Austrians, but every time they were forced to retreat. After sending the artillery to help the III corps, Klapka went to the right flank, but, seing that the soldiers of Poeltemberg cannot hold the attack of Schlik's corps.[40] Klapka commanded another attack, but with the same result, so he understood that the victory cannot be achieved.[41] He decided to start the retreat, so ordered to the artillery positioned on the heights before the Ács and Cherry forrests, to cover with its fire the retreat of his troops, which was carried out without being pursued by the Austrians. At 5.00 p.m. all the Hungarian units were behind the entrenchments of Komárom.[42]

The battle of Komárom from 11 July was the last chance of the Hungarian army to defeat the main Austrian army led by Haynau before the Russian army of Field Marshall Ivan Paskevich. Görgei had to content himself with the victory from 2 July, but without crushing Haynau's army, as he planned.[43] The defeat from 11 July had multiple causes. Even the purpose of the battle was contradictory. Görgei wanted to break through the Austrian troops towards West, then, conform to Kossuth's expectations, to retreat with the Hungarian army towards South East towards the Tisza river.[44] But for this, he had to cross the Danube with his troops. Haynau would follow him, and when he tried to cross the Danube on the pontoon bridge from Paks, the Austrians could easily push the Hungarians into the river. Or Haynau could join Paskevich Russian troops at Pest, and then together attack the retreating Görgei.[45] If the battle would had ended as it was planned, this plan enforced by Kossuth could easily bring a crushing catastrophy for the Hungarian armies. Maybe this is the cause why the Hungarians did not planned and executed this battle with all the attention and devotion required for such an important task. Maybe this is the cause why although the concept of this battle was to break through the enemy's lines, the Hungarian attack was carried out like a general attack against the enemy.[46] The Swiss military historian Wilhelm Rüstow in his book Geschichte des ungarischen Insurrectionskrieges in den Jahren 1848 und 1849 analizing this battle, pointed that a break through on the enemy lines could had been succeded only with carefully concentrating important superior numbered troops on the weakest point of the enemy, while in the case of the third battle of Komárom this didn't happened. Such a place would have been the place between the mail road from Ács and the main road to Igmánd, where the Hungarians should have concentrate 32 000 - 34 000 soldiers, and with this force they could had break through the Austrian right wing, and achieve the victory.[47] Instead of this Klapka divided his troops equally on the battlefield.[48]

Klapka did not leaded with the necessary vigor his uncertain and passive generals (Nagysándor and Pikéthy), although to achieve a victory in such a battle all the units had to carry out their tasks with the maximum determination and strength.[49] The Hungarian military historian Tamás Csikány believes that Klapka was unsure about the purpose of this battle, but he did not wanted to oppose Kossuth's and Görgei's plan, and did not wanted to loose many soldiers either in this battle.[50]

There were errors also on the Austrian side: the leader of the Austrian cavalry division Lieutenand General Philip Bechtold, despite Haynau's orders to attack the Hungarians with full determination, failed to fulfill this order.[51] But nevertheless Haynau achieved the victory he needed: he prevented the Hungarians breach attempt, forcing Görgei to live Komárom on the left (Northern) banks of the Danube, enabling him to reach the Hungarian capitals before the Hungarians, and to block their way towards South East to the Hungarian armies gathering point around Szeged, as it was planned by Kossuth.[52]

This battle was among the most cherished Austrian victories by the emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria, who commanded two paintings for his workroom, depicting his troops victories in Hungary: one was about the Battle of Temesvár from 9 August 1849, the decissive victory of Austrians, the other showed the Battle from Komárom from 11 July.[53]

• First Battle of Komárom (1849)
• Second Battle of Komárom (1849)
• Fourth Battle of Komárom (1849)

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