Integralist Uprising

Following the failed 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution, both liberal constitutionalists and tenentes would be undermined in favor of the extremes of communists and Integralists.

Revolutionary leader Getúlio Vargas became president of Brazil following the month-long Revolution of 1930 against the oligarchic Old Republic. The new regime which Vargas would assume leadership of was built upon a heterogenous coalition of forces which were united only in their opposition to President Washington Luís, whom Vargas replaced after the senior military had removed him from office.[3][4] Of the revolutionaries, which included the higher military, coffee growers, and politicians, the two major groups were liberal constitutionalists and the tenentes, or semi-authoritarian nationalist junior officers. The former yearned for free elections and civil liberties, while the latter feared elections being too soon. After Vargas took power, the constitutionalists grew suspicious of the President and the tenentes following several delays to their requests for electoral reform. In early 1932, the Democratic Party of São Paulo, the main party of the constitutionalists, formed a United Front with other parties in the state. They rose in revolt during the Constitutionalist Revolution in July 1932. However, the revolt failed after two months due to regionalist sentiments alienating the São Paulo rebels from uniting with other states in opposition to the federal government.[5]

Through a series of decrees, Vargas organized a National Constituent Assembly to be elected and create a new constitution. They did so, finishing in July 1934, and afterward elected Vargas to a four-year term ending in May 1938. In theory, the National Congress, divided into the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, gained and lost some power, with the presidency sustaining the greatest blow to its power.[6][7] Historian Jordan M. Young states, "In reality, however, the legislative branch was the docile instrument of a strong chief executive. Anything and everything that Vargas wanted was granted."[8]

Meanwhile, during this change in government, politics were being radicalized. Liberal constitutionalists and tenentes were being replaced by political extremes. While the catastrophic revolt of 1932 undermined the liberal constitutionalists, the tenentes were not accustomed to a popular following, and despite being the leading voice for socioeconomic issues after 1930, they lost unity after mid-1932 and, essentially, disappeared after 1934.[9] The Communist Party of Brazil formed a popular front called the National Liberation Alliance (ANL).[lower-alpha 2] The former middle-class liberal constitutionalists turned to rallying for the ANL, in part due to the appeal of the movement's honorary president and former leader of the Prestes Column rebellion, Luís Carlos Prestes. Since 1932, the Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB),[lower-alpha 3] a fascist movement headed by Plínio Salgado, also recruited the middle-class. It was founded in São Paulo, and also received support from academics, those with German and Italian ancestry, and the Armed Forces. Salgado used "green shirts," street rallies, and violence against the left to promote the rightist ideology. The loose-knit Liberal Alliance, as the coalition was called, created during the 1930 Revolution was being supplanted by more radical, wider, national political movements.[12][11]

The ANL promised on 13 May 1935 for Prestes to deliver a manifesto on 5 July the same year. Following this, on 12 July, after a week of the ANL's press turning belligerent against the government, the federal police seized archives from the ANL's headquarters and padlocked its doors.[14] In the name of the ANL, three separate insurrections broke out at Natal, Recife, and Rio de Janeiro in late November 1935. All failed to gain support and faltered quickly. In response, the government declared a national state of emergency and established government bodies (such as the National Commission for the Repression of Communism) to subdue the opposition.[15]

Plínio Salgado

It was in this anti-communist climate that the left was undermined and the nation as a whole backed President Vargas. Additionally, Salgado had offered Vargas 100,000 green shirts to help the government during the short insurrection.[16] Integralists looked to the presidential election of 1938 with, in the words of historian John W. F. Dulles, "an assurance born of the Communist rebellion."[17] Many important officials were associated with Integralism; the director of the Government Mind and an important official of the Bank of Brazil were both on the "Council of 40," the top political organ of the AIB, and on the "Council of 400," in charge of promoting Integralism throughout Brazil, sat members of the state police and the Armed Forces. Police Chief Filinto Müller and numerous generals, potentially even Vargas himself at one point, fully backed the AIB. Benito Mussolini's son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano sent contributions to the movement. Salgado entered the presidential election in June 1937, both claiming he was going to save democracy in the name of Jesus Christ and threatening enemies of the AIB with punishment. He joined the race at a time when the presidential campaign seemed to be in shambles with left-leaning government candidate José Américo de Almeida, war in Europe seemed imminent, and the military and federal government wished for interventions in difficult states.[18][19]

In late September 1937, Captain Olímpio Mourão Filho, an Integralist, was found typing a plan in the office of the Army Chief of Staff, eventually reaching senior officials who exposed it to the nation. Newspapers were filled with the Integralist's fabricated plan calling for a communist takeover and hundreds to be massacred. It was only revealed years later that, as a member of the AIB's "historical department," Filho was drafting a theoretical communist attack to prepare a counterattack, and that the Cohen Plan, as it was called, publicized differed from his original version. The impression on Congress was strong, and they met the day after the plan was made public (1 October) to declare a state of war.[20][21] Francisco Campos authored a new constitution, approved by a strong majority of the military. When Campos met with Salgado to tell him about the secretive plan for a new regime, Salgado expressed support even if he did not agree entirely with the strong government perscribed by the constitution, telling Campos the Integralists were essentially democratic. Campos assured Salgado the Integralists would become the "base of the New State," and the two men got along extremely well.[22]

Integralist militia members, Paraná, 1935

Events escalated quickly. On 1 November, Integralists held the parade of "50,000 Green Shirts" (though, in reality, Vargas's counters reported it was closer to 17,000), observed by President Vargas and military aides, including the pro-Integralist General Newton Cavalcanti.[23][24] Salgado declared the marchers were "taking this opportunity to affirm their solidarity with the President of the Republic and the Armed forces in their fight against Communism and anarchical democracy, and to proclaim the principles of a new regime," adding the fight was against international capitalism, and finally stated, "What I desire is not to be President of the Republic, but simply the adviser of my country."[24] Instead of even taking a chance with elections, on 10 November Vargas, with military and Integralist support, abrogated the old constitution in favor of Campos's quasi-totalitarian one, gave a speech in which he attacked Congress, declared a national emergency, and transitioned the country to a dictatorship. When Vargas made his first public appearance after the installation of the new regime, the Estado Novo, on 15 November to inaugurate a statue of the first president, Deodoro da Fonseca, the Integralists were there to salute him. However, despite the Integralist's ties with the government, General Pedro Aurélio de Góis Monteiro gave, as one of his reasons for the coup of 10 November, that the strength of the Integralists could prove to lead to their own coup.[25][26][27]

Over the course of the Estado Novo, Integralists proved to be disillusioned. They were the only political group to remain untouched, and they believed they would gain from the coup. Vargas believed that Salgado and the Integralists were keen on pursuing the example of Adolf Hitler in replacing Paul von Hindenburg and hoped to curtail this. The first signs of the break between the government and the Integralists was Vargas's failure to mention them in his 10 November radio broadcast and Salgado being informed about the coup much later than he believed appropriate. By presidential decree on 2 December, all political parties were outlawed, including the AIB; by a new law code announced via a radio broadcast at midnight, 31 December, and per Article 2 of the national constitution, only the national flag, anthem, and coat of arms would be permitted instead of those of the states' and the Integralists; and, by inquiring with Campos, Salgado learned Vargas made the appointment of a new Minister of Education contingent on the complete suppression of Integralism. Vargas had earlier offered Salgado the post, to which Salgado refused, and when Salgado reconsidered and recommended it be offered to another Integralist, Gustavo Barroso, the government ignored him. To accommodate with the 2 December decree, Salgado reorganized the AIB as the Brazilian Cultural Association (Associação Brasileira de Cultura), and Integralist symbols, uniform, and rituals quietly disappeared. The organization divided into those who wanted to accommodate and operate under the new regime and those who opposed and wished to overthrow it. Following the seizure of Integralist works and the arrest of Integralists, the Council of 40 voted in late January 1938 38–2 to not collaborate with Vargas.[lower-alpha 4][29][30][31][32][33]

Late in 1937, a conspiracy began against the Estado Novo. It involved many intertwined persons and groups: Washington Luís's former Foreign Minister, Otávio Mangabeira; a participant in the Constitutionalist Revolution who had turned down the option to lead the 1930 Revolution, General Euclides Figueiredo; the exiled former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Flores da Cunha; a Bahian physician, Belmiro Valverde; the head of the Army's War Material Division, José Maria Castro Júnior; the Integralists; and the Navy. Mangabeira and Figueiredo plotted at the Glória Hotel in Rio; Cunha provided monetary contribution when an agent for the conspiracy visited Argentina and Uruguay for support; Valverde, the Integralists' finance secretary, was appointed by Salgado as head of the Integralists in Rio, and the physician too also joined the conspiracy; Júnior took leadership of the military aspect of the movement; Salgado kept ties with the hotel's conspirators; and in early January 1938, commander of the Navy Vítor Pujol and another officer told Valverde, the Council of 40's secretary Barroso, and Integralist Olbiano de Melo that the Navy would march on the Guanabara Palace, seat of the presidency, with or without Integralist support.[33][34][35]

Proactive authorities, however, foiled the plot, scheduled originally for 10 March 1938. A small group of insurgents, led by Fernando Cochrane and Francisco Barbosa, attacked "the Post Office and Telegraph building, the electricity generating plants, Mayrink Veiga Radio station and the Naval School". The Naval School was the most important part of the plan, which would involve the taking of the installations by Integralist sailors which in turn would lead to the capture of Vargas who would have lunch at the base that day. There was terrible confusion among rebels. Some had received postponement orders after loyal soldiers had been made prisoners.[33][34][35][36] Dulles states that "it became complete during the following days when messages for starting and stopped the 'rebellion' were issued in rapid succession."[37]

Sixty days after the first coup attempt, a mobilization began to try to arrest Getúlio Vargas and take over the government. The action was facilitated because it had some infiltrators, such as "the Guard of the Guanabara Palace, commanded by integralist lieutenant Júlio do Nascimento; the head of the Guard in the Civil Police, in charge of lieutenant Soter, and also several service officers in the Navy and in the Army".[33]

Even so, the result was unfavorable for the integralists. At the palace, out of the 150 who had volunteered to participate in the insurrection, only 30 were present in the confrontation with the guard at the government headquarters and some relatives of Vargas. In addition, the insurgents only had two trucks to transport the troops. The rebels were not able to imprison officers such as Eurico Gaspar Dutra, who escaped by leaving his residence and ended up leading troops that came from the Leme Fort and expelled the integralists from the presidential palace, Góis Monteiro, Francisco Campos, Cristóvão Barcelos, among others.[33]

As a result, around 1,500 Integralists were arrested and Plínio Salgado, leader of the Brazilian Integralist Action, went into exile in Portugal, from where he tried to reorganize the Integralist movement.[38]

• Abreu, Alzira (2001). Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro: pós 1930 (in Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro: FGV CPDOC.

• Dulles, John W.F. (2012). Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-74078-5.
• Fausto, Boris; Fausto, Sergio (2014). A Concise History of Brazil (2nd, revised ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-63524-1.
• Levine, Robert M. (1970). The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934–1938. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-03370-1.
• Marques, Anthéro José (1942). Livro Histórico do Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais (in Portuguese). Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Marinha.
• Menandro, Heloísa. "Revolta Integralista". FGV CPDOC. Retrieved 20 March 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
• Skidmore, Thomas E. (2007). Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-533269-8.
• Young, Jordan M. (1967). The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. OCLC 651337306.