German Fatherland Party

The German Fatherland Party (German: Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, abbreviated as DVLP[15]) was a short-lived far-right[16] political party active in the German Empire during the last phase of World War I. Its purpose was to mobilize the political right in a broad catch-all movement (Sammlungsbewegung),[17] reject the Burgfriedenspolitik or "party truce" policy which dominated the domestic political landscape at that time and promote maximum German war goals. In terms of organizational history, the Fatherland Party is considered the first attempt at reconciliation and cooperation between the traditional right, characteristic of the Wilhelmine Period, and militant nationalists of the extreme right who would become popular during the interwar period.[18][19][20][21]

German Fatherland Party
Deutsche Vaterlandspartei
AbbreviationDVLP
Honorary ChairmanDuke John Albert of Mecklenburg[1]
ChairmanAlfred von Tirpitz[2]
Deputy ChairmanWolfgang Kapp[3]
Founded2 September 1917;[lower-alpha 1]
Königsberg, East Prussia
Dissolved10 December 1918
Merged intoDNVP (de facto)[5][6]
HeadquartersBerlin, Germany
Think tankPan-German League
Membership1,250,000 (July 1918 est.)[7]
Ideology
Political positionRight-wing to far-right
Colours  Black   White   Red
(German Imperial colours)
Seats in the
Reichstag
0 / 397(0%)

The dissolution of the Fatherland Party predicted the failure of the traditional politics of notables (Honoratiorenpolitik) of the "old right" from Imperial Germany, which, during the Weimar Republic, found itself competing with "new" movements and parties over leadership, propaganda and mass mobilization. In addition, this new party's belief in modern political techniques, such as the importance of propaganda and its effect on public opinion has more in common with the European fascist regimes of the interwar period than the old-style traditional conservative politics of Imperial Germany.[22] The proximity of the former German Conservative and large sections of the National Liberal electorate to the new German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) made this party a reservoir for former activists of the German Fatherland Party (including Tirpitz, who was elected as a member of parliament in 1924).[23]

History

Background

In late July 1917, on the heels of the passing of the Peace Resolution, Erich Ludendorff began his propaganda campaign to "uplift army morale" and win over public opinion on the home front. According to Ludendorff, the two were intertwined. This program was originally called 'Enlightenment service' (Aujklarungsdienst) but was changed to 'Patriotic Instruction' (Vaterliindischer Unterricht) in September 1917. According to historian David Welch, Ludendorff's program stressed four ideas:[24]

1. The Causes of the War, The economic development of Germany, its importance, and consequences of a lost war, particularly from the point of view of the working class.[25]
2. Confidence in Final Victory, The war was turning decisively in Germany's favour, and devotion to duty and manly pride are encouraged.[26]
3. The Necessity and Importance of Leadership, the necessity for authority and its corollary, obedience. There must be unflinching confidence in the Emperor and the princes of the federal states and military leaders.[27]
4. The Enemy, who is placing all his hopes on our economic and political collapse, must be convinced that we cannot be beaten in the field.[28]

It was Ludendorff’s "last throw of the propaganda dice," and he assumed overall responsibility for both its conception and its implementation. However, by September 1917, reports coming into the OHL suggested that the "patriotic instruction" program failed to counter people’s negative perceptions of the war as the public viewed it increasingly as "cheap propaganda." Ludendorff's propaganda ideas proved to appear remarkably similar to the later German Fatherland Party aims. This has provided a symmetry which many historians have noticed.

Foundation

Backed by the Pan-German League,[29][30] the German Fatherland Party was founded by Heinrich Claß, August von Dönhoff, Alfred von Tirpitz and Wolfgang Kapp[31][32] on 2 September 1917 on the 47th anniversary of Sedan Day, a holiday that commemorated the German victory over France in 1870. The event took place in the Yorck room of the city hall in Königsberg.[33][34] After much deliberation, the leaders finally settled on naming the new party the German Fatherland Party, after considering other possible names, including the Bismarck Union, the Bismarck Party, and the Hindenburg Party.[35][36] However, these names "would have been considered a snub of the Kaiser" and were rejected. On 9 September, the DVLP made its existence public in newspaper advertisements. The established bourgeois parties reacted inconsistently to the founding of the Fatherland Party. Many conservative parties expressly welcomed them. The board of the National Liberal Party offered to cooperate with the Fatherland Party and left party members the option to join it. The left-liberal Progressive People's Party, which lost a noticeable number of members to the DVLP, expressly refused to work with it. The Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) told party members on 12 October 1917 not to assist the DVLP.[37]

Dissolution

The November Revolution effectively ended the existence of the DVLP. Until 28 November, the board met again and agreed to stop all "public activities." Furthermore, the members were asked to agitate for the early convocation of a national assembly, to ensure that the "national forces" were gathered together, and, for the time being, to support the Council of the People's Deputies in "maintaining order." Finally, on 10 December 1918, the Reich Committee of the DVLP, which about 20 people only visited, decided to dissolve the party. On this occasion, a three-member liquidation committee was established, which initiated the transfer of the party's assets to the German National People’s Party (DNVP) and became finalized on 1 February 1919.

Subsequent influence

During World War I, Anton Drexler joined the German Fatherland Party[38] but quickly grew disillusioned with what he saw as its lack of genuine interest in the plight of the working-class.[39] After the war, he would go on to form a similar organization, the German Workers' Party, which later became the National Socialist German Workers' Party, better known as the Nazi Party, that came to national power in January 1933 under Adolf Hitler.[40] In Die Erben Bismarcks, published in 1970, German scholar Dirk Stegmann concluded that the Fatherland Party was pre- or proto-fascist because of the later Nazi connections to Anton Drexler.[41] It should be considered that many historians challenge this position. In 1997, scholar Heinz Hagenlücke argued that the Fatherland Party was in fact not proto-fascist because "the party was explicitly founded as a party and not a movement, members reflected the typical picture of high Wilhelmine society in contrast to the lower class organizations of the Weimar Republic, which sociologically reached the lower-middle class, soldiers, and the youth."[42]

Ideology

Political positions

The Fatherland Party represented pan-German,[43] national liberal, conservative, nationalist, populist, antisemitic and völkisch political circles, united in their opposition against the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 1917. It played a vital role in the emergence of the stab-in-the-back myth and the defamation of certain politicians as the November Criminals.[44][45] However to the frustration of antisemitic sections of the party, Tirpitz also welcomed Jews as members.

Militarism played an essential role in the party.[46] In March–April 1915, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz stated that the only thing that was keeping Germany from winning the war was the poor leadership of the Chancellor and the Emperor. His solution was a plan in which Bethmann-Hollweg would be sacked, and the office of Chancellor abolished; the Kaiser would "temporarily" abdicate; and Generalfeldmarschall Hindenburg be given the new office of "Dictator of the Reich," concentrating all political and military power into his hands to win the war.[47] These positions continued to receive support from the Fatherland Party. Internally, there were calls for a coup d'etat against the German government, led by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, even against the Emperor if necessary.

Though the Tirpitz plan was not implemented, the very fact it was mooted showed the extent of military dissatisfaction with the existing leadership and the strength of the "state within the state" in that Tirpitz was not punished despite having essentially called for deposing the Emperor.[47] In August 1916, Germany became a de facto military dictatorship under the duumvirate of Generalfeldmarschall Hindenburg and Generalquartiermeister Ludendorff, who ruled Germany until 1918.[48] During the rule of the "silent dictatorship" of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the German government advocated a set of imperialist war aims calling for the annexation of most of Europe and Africa that in many ways were a prototype for the war aims of the Second World War.[49]

Foreign policy objectives

Alleged map of German plans for a new political order in Central and Eastern Europe
Possible outcome of a German victory in Africa with German pre-WW1 possessions in dark blue and gains in medium blue

The official purpose for the existence of the Fatherland Party was to end the war victoriously and secure a "German peace." However, the war aims were not laid out in any specific program. They remained flexible in scope and outlook as the party focused on domestic politics to propagate a "Siegfrieden" (victorious war).[50] On 24 September 1917, Tirpitz had demanded a "correct solution to the Belgian question," a "safeguarding of the open sea lanes," "physical compensation" and a "place in the sun" secured for Germany. In the months that followed, the following ideas gradually emerged:[51][52]

The war aims of the DVLP were concerted at every possible opportunity in "countless meetings (...) and a flood of declarations, appeals, writings, demands and telegrams to the Kaiser, the government, the Reichstag, the Supreme Army Command and to the public" became known and popularized. Above all, this should create the impression of a "primitive popular movement."[53]

Domestic neutrality

In the first few months of its existence, the DVLP repeatedly emphasized its "national" character and its alleged domestic political neutrality. The call to members and supporters, which was still little veiled in the "Great Appeal," to stand up against a Prussian electoral reform, the parliamentarization of Reich policy, and the government's commitment to the DVLP line were deleted on 24 September 1917, without comment. The party promised not to put up its own candidates for Reichstag elections, and the "internal dispute" should rest until the war's end. However, this demonstration of disinterest was merely a tactical tool that arose from the DVLP's political concept. The main domestic political goal of the party leadership was clearly to force a dissolution of the Reichstag employing extra-parliamentary pressure. This was justified with a populist and pseudo-democratic argument that parliament no longer portrayed the "will of the people."

The most damaging critique of the Fatherland Party was that it was reactionary and therefore against all political reforms, which hurt the party in winning the masses to its side. However, the party realized this danger and tried to assure the German population that it was apolitical and not reactionary. The leaders of the Fatherland Party (whether candidly or not) claimed to stand aside in all political debates and professed that internal reforms were not important now that only the will to win the war was vital to Germany's survival. Kapp and Tirpitz's ultimate goal was to end party strife and unite the people behind them in a unified block.[54]

Prussian emphasis

The founders of the party declared that they represented all Germans but placed emphasis on their own Prussian heritage by writing that "the undersigned men of East Prussia ... have founded the German Fatherland Party" and continuously referred only to the Prussian greatness of Germany. For instance, they did not mention the heritage of Charlemagne or any other great Holy Roman Emperor, but only wrote about Germany's recent Prussian and non-Catholic tradition, "calling to mind with gratitude our first beloved Emperor of undying memory and his iron Chancellor," who waged a "titanic struggle against destructive party strife." The Fatherland Party's concentration on Germany's Prussian past was used by its enemies, especially the Center Party, to claim that the Fatherland Party did not represent all Germans.[55]

Working-class support

The propaganda of the German Fatherland Party advocated holding out for a Siegfrieden (Victory Peace), increasing the Siegeswillen (Will for Victory) within the German population, and creating a unified block of citizens within Germany by reviving the idea of Burgfrieden and stressing the empowering myth of Deutschtum or an essential "Germanness." In order to create a unified block, the leaders of the Fatherland Party attempted to gain recognition among the working classes. However, these efforts were handicapped as many socialist and leftist newspapers refused to print the party's announcements and advertisements. Nevertheless, this situation did not mean the Fatherland Party could not succeed in reaching portions of the working class. According to Alex Hall, in Scandal, Sensation, and Social Democracy, unemployed workers did in fact read non-socialist papers, in particular, to find job advertisements, since employers were unwilling to place employment announcements in socialist publications, thus making them susceptible to the Fatherland Party's propaganda.[56][57] There was definitely an opportunity for a right-wing party to gain influence among the working classes, although the Fatherland Party did not. However, this does not mean that the party was a complete failure. In fact, if one considers that the Fatherland Party's real goal was to rally all aspects of the middle-class behind the war effort, by creating the image of a desperate, hungry, and revolutionary working-class that would emerge in Germany if the war ended in failure, the party did achieve some success.[lower-alpha 2]

Anglophobia

The Fatherland Party blamed the United Kingdom for forcing or tricking other countries into the war against Germany.[59] At the party's first rally, Tirpitz exclaimed that America had declared war on Germany because it "has become the puppet of Anglo-Saxon capitalism," for Germany "from the birth hour forward" has only been friendly towards America. Tirpitz declared that "if Washington could descend from Heaven, he would not tolerate America's move." Furthermore, the Fatherland Party stated that "Germany is leading the fight for freedom of the entire European continent against the tyranny of Anglo-Americanism that is devouring everything."[60] The Fatherland Party maintained Britain was "the originator of the world conflagration." It claimed Britain started the war because Germany was a "strong economic competitor and they did not want to compete peacefully," for all Germans know that "for the English, the war is a matter of business." The party also accused Britain of wanting "to kill the soul of the German people" and of fighting the war "in a devilish manner by attempting to kill our innocent women and children through hunger to force our men to their knees."[61]

Organization

Leadership

The party's leaders were Wolfgang Kapp[62] who would later instigate the failed attempted coup in 1920 known as the Kapp Putsch and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,[63] a naval minister and post-war party leader. Walter Nicolai, head of the military secret service, was also supportive.[64] Media baron Alfred Hugenberg was also a prominent member. The party included many leading industrialists, large landowners, and business association officials, including Georg Wilhelm von Siemens, Carl Duisberg, Ernst von Borsig, Hugo Stinnes, Emil Kirdorf and Hermann Röchling, but also humanities scholars such as Eduard Meyer.

The Fatherland Party held two congresses (on 24 September 1917 and 19 April 1918 in Berlin). The statute did not provide a delegation procedure, and every party member could participate in the party congresses, which were purely forums for acclamation. The Select Committee called a party congress. In addition, there was a Reich Committee, which was composed of the Executive Board, the Select Committee, and 50 individuals to be determined by the party congress, but only met three times. In addition to Tirpitz, Johann Albrecht and Kapp, the DVLP board of directors was made up of the following people: Gottfried Traub, August Rumpf, Heinrich Beythien, Carl Pfeiffer, Lambert Brockmann, Wilhelm von Siemens, Dietrich Schäfer, Franz von Reichenau, Ernst Schweckendieck, Otto Hoffmann, Ulrich von Hassell and Stephan von Nieber. The party executive of the DVLP had a powerful, almost independent position - it could not be changed from within the party and chose new members if necessary. Decisions were made in small groups; according to the statute, the committee had a quorum when two (from April 1918 three) members were present.[65] The Select Committee, abolished in April 1918, later included the eight people appointed in September 1917.

Source of funding

The party's political influence peaked in the summer of 1918 when it had around 1,250,000 members.[66] Close ties existed between the Fatherland Party and the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) with the military providing the party’s main source of funding[67][68] and featuring statements from the party in the military’s official publication Militär-Wochenblatt. Many former officers joined the DVLP; those on active duty were not permitted to participate in any political party.[69] The party was officially dissolved during the German Revolution on 10 December 1918. Most of its members later joined the German National People's Party (DNVP), the major national-conservative party in Germany during the Weimar Republic. Before the rise of the Nazi Party, it was the major conservative and nationalist party in Weimar Germany.

Head of the noticeably large head office of the party with its last nine departments and up to 137 employees were (one after the other) Kapp's close confidante Georg Wilhelm Schiele, Franz Ferdinand Eiffe, and Konrad Scherer. Huge sums of money were incurred for the maintenance and activities of the DVLP party apparatus, which were completely unusual for other contemporary parties. In addition, the party gave the bulk of its literature and other propaganda material completely free of charge. This effort could not possibly be covered only by membership fees and occasional donations. In the spring of 1918 alone, the sum of the initially uncovered expenses averaged 142,000 marks per month.

In addition to the support from the Pan-German League, the Fatherland Party also received additional support from a number of nationalist organizations and pressure groups. Among them were the German Eastern Marches Society, German Navy League, German Colonial Society, German Anti-Semitic Organization and the Defence League.[70][71] These organizations became collectively known as the nationale Verbände.

Party infrastructure

The DVLP had its central main management based in Berlin and was divided into state, district, and local associations at the middle and lower levels. The Berlin headquarters of the DVLP employed almost 150 members at the end of 1917. According to the statutes, the state, district, and local associations were set up as required. The local associations could only communicate with the party executive through the state associations. District associations were only to be interposed when needed; they had no members and only served the regional associations as administrative bodies. In July 1918, 32 state associations, 237 district associations, and 2,536 local associations across Germany.[72][73]

Membership

According to its own information, the DVLP had 450,000 members in March 1918, 1,250,000 in July, and 800,000 in September. However, these numbers are considered highly exaggerated. At least, very likely, but more than half of the members belonged to "patriotic" clubs and associations affiliated with the Fatherland Party. It is also known that several higher officials - including Prussian government presidents - forced the staff of the departments and authorities they headed to join the party. The party tried harder to attract workers, especially after the January strike. A guideline for party speakers had previously stated that the worker "must gain the understanding that he is serving himself by joining our party; because our party especially serves the welfare of the workers by advocating a peace that secures our economic future." As early as January 1918, the party officially claimed to have over 290,000 "registered workers" in its ranks.[74]

Propaganda strategy

The organizers of the Fatherland Party were new in the intensity of their belief that propaganda was crucial in controlling public opinion within Germany. The party administration organized priests, journalists, and teachers to act as travelling lecturers spreading the party's message throughout the Reich. They were sent to specific regions according to their religion and place of birth, making contact with the masses better. For example, a Catholic Bavarian would be sent to Bavaria to address a predominantly Catholic audience. Kapp even suggested letting "several lecturers speak at once to reach a broader audience."[75] The party also founded a press department under the control of Dr. Klemens Klein, a professional historian and the chief editor of the Dusseldorf Zeitung from 1907–1915, that disseminated propaganda via newspapers and other printed media. To reach the broadest audience possible, the party wanted to publish its propaganda in leftist and liberal newspapers. Still, many of these newspapers were not willing to print the Fatherland Party's announcements. As a result of this refusal, most of the Fatherland Party's propaganda was found in rightist papers. The propaganda contained in these conservative and right-wing newspapers highlighted themes similar to those initially found in the party's first manifesto and public rally, such as the need to unify the people of Germany, to increase the will to victory within the German population, to ensure the future prosperity of Germany by achieving a victory peace, and to reassure the citizens that the German military remained strong and triumphant in the field.[76]

References

Informational notes

  1. Both historians Jeffery Verhey and Hans-Ulrich Wehler claim that the Fatherland Party was actually founded on 3 September, but regardless of the actual date of its founding, the party clearly wanted the German population to believe that it was founded on the symbolically potent Sedan Day.[4]
  2. This idea came out a discussion with Dr. Denise Phillips, assistant professor of German history at the University of Tennessee, as we were discussing the Fatherland Party's lack of insight into the needs of the working class. We came to a tentative conclusion that the party may have been really trying to create an image of a resentful and revolutionary working class to unite the middle-class (out of fear) behind the goals of the Fatherland Party.[58]

Citations

  1. Fischer, Fritz (1967). Germany's aims in the First World War. p. 461. ISBN 9780393053470.
  2. Kelly, Patrick (2011). Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy pp. 410–421. ISBN 978-0253355935.
  3. Welch, David (2000). Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission p. 200. ISBN 978-0485004076.
  4. Dempster, 2006, p. 19.
  5. Hadry, 2007. Quote: "Party leaders and assets were transferred to the German National People's Party."
  6. Heinrich, August (2008). Germany: The Long Road West, 1789–1933 p. 352. ISBN 978-0199265978.
  7. Dempster, 2006, p. 1.
  8. Dempster, 2006, p. 35.
  9. Yurievich, Klimov (2017). EDUARD MEYER IN THE YEARS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REPUBLIC OF WEIMAR pp. 45-57.
  10. Meinecke, Friedrich (1951). The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections p. 30. ISBN 978-0807056677.
  11. Dempster, 2006, pp. 35–36.
  12. "Adolf Hitler's First Steps In Politics - The Foundation Of The Nazi Party I THE GREAT WAR 1919 (Timestamp 11:24)". Archived from the original on 2021-12-19.
  13. Hagenlücke, Heinz (2015). German Fatherland Party (Deutsche Vaterlandspartei – DVLP)
  14. Dempster, 2006, pp. 40–41.
  15. Wette, Wolfram (2002). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality p. 41. ISBN 978-0-674-02577-6.
  16. Dassen, 2013, pp. 161–187.
  17. Hofmeister, Björn (2016). German Fatherland Party, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson. Freie Universität Berlin. Berlin 2016-10-26. doi:10.15463/ie1418.10992.
  18. (2003). German history of society. Volume 4: From the beginning of the First World War to the founding of the two German states 1914–1949, p. 108; Historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler described the DVLP as quote, "[...] the first right-wing radical proto-fascist mass party."
  19. Peck, Abraham (1978). Radicals and reactionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Germany pp. 203–221. doi:10.1017/S0018246X00021105.
  20. Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Peter-Christian Witt (1983). German Conservatism in the 19th and 20th Century pp. 199–230.
  21. Hagenlücke, Heinz (1997). Deutsche Vaterlandspartei: Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaiserreiches. German Studies Review. pp. 18, 402. ISBN 978-3770051977.
  22. Dempster, 2006, p. 32.
  23. Hofmeister, Björn (2016). German Fatherland Party, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson. Freie Universität Berlin. Berlin 2016-10-26. doi:10.15463/ie1418.10992.
  24. Feldman, Gerald (1966). Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 429. ISBN 978-0854967643.
  25. Welch, 2014, pp. 99–121.
  26. Welch, 2014, pp. 99–121.
  27. Welch, 2014, pp. 99–121.
  28. Welch, 2014, pp. 99–121.
  29. Schädlich, Karlheinz (1966) Der Unabhängige Ausschuß für einen Deutschen Frieden als ein Zentrum der Annexionspropaganda des deutschen Imperialismus im ersten Weltkrieg
  30. Klein, Fritz (1964) Politik im Krieg 1914–1918. Studien zur Politik der deutschen herrschenden Klassen im ersten Weltkrieg. Berlin Akademie-Verlag. pp. 50–65
  31. Jennifer Llewellyn, Steve Thompson, (2019). Alpha History; WOLFGANG KAPP
  32. Wolfgang Kapp Biography
  33. Dempster, 2006, p. 19.
  34. Judson, 2011, p. 508.
  35. Eley, Geoff (1982). Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck p. 341. ISBN 978-0472081325.
  36. Fritzsche, Peter (1998). Germans into Nazis p. 65. ISBN 978-0674350922
  37. Ullrich, Robert (1968). Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, in: Dieter Fricke (Ed.): The bourgeois parties in Germany. Handbook of the history of the bourgeois parties and other bourgeois interest organizations from Vormärz to 1945. Leipzig, Volume 1, pp. 620–628
  38. Hamilton 1984, p. 219.
  39. Dempster, 2006, p. 2.
  40. Shirer 1991, p. 34.
  41. Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbiinde in der Spiitphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands Sammlungspolitik, 1897-1918 (Berlin: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970).
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  45. Dempster, 2006, p. 43.
  46. Dempster, 2006, p. 44.
  47. Wheeler-Bennett, p. 13.
  48. Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 13–14.
  49. Hillgruber, Andreas (1981). Germany and the Two World Wars. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). pp. 41–45. ISBN 978-0674353220.
  50. Hofmeister, Björn (2016). German Fatherland Party, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson. Freie Universität Berlin. Berlin 2016-10-26. doi:10.15463/ie1418.10992.
  51. Tuchman, Barbara (1962). The Guns of August. New York, New York: Macmillan Co. p. 321. ISBN 9780026203104.
  52. "Bethmann Hollweg, Germany's War Aims". wwnorton.com. Retrieved 2020-04-23.
  53. Manfred Weißbecker: German Fatherland Party, in Dieter Fricke et al .: Lexicon for party history. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties and associations in Germany (1789–1945). Volume 2, Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig 1984, pp. 397.
  54. Dempster, 2006, p. 37.
  55. Dempster, 2006, pp. 23–24.
  56. Dempster, 2006, pp. 5–6.
  57. Hall, Alex (1977) Scandal, Sensation and Social Democracy: The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany 1890-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 36. ISBN 978-0521085267.
  58. Dempster, 2006, pp. 6–7.
  59. Dempster, 2006, p. 28.
  60. Dempster, 2006, p. 29.
  61. Dempster, 2006, p. 28.
  62. Dempster, 2006, p. 20.
  63. Dempster, 2006, pp. 19, 21.
  64. Höhne and Zolling, 1972, p. 290.
  65. Hagenlücke, 1997, p. 164.
  66. Chickering, Roger (1998). Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 p. 165. ISBN 978-0521547802.
  67. Feldman, Gerald (1966). Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 p. 429. ISBN 978-0854967643.
  68. Dempster, 2006, pp. 16–17.
  69. Wette, Wolfram (2002). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality pp. 41-42. ISBN 978-0674025776.
  70. Geoff Eley, op.cit., p.VII
  71. Peter von Polenz (1999). Deutsche Sprachgeschichte 3: vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Gegenwart.: 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert (History of the German language) (in German). Walter de Gruyter. pp. 28–29. ISBN 3-11-014344-5.
  72. Weißbecker, Manfred. German Fatherland Party, p. 397.
  73. Hofmeister, 2011, pp. 128, 489.
  74. Stegmann, Dirk (1972) Between Repression and Manipulation: Conservative Power Elites and Workers 'and Employees' Movement 1910–1918. A contribution to the prehistory of the DAP / NSDAP, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Vol. 12, pp. 351-432.
  75. Hagenlücke, Heinz (1998). Deutsche Vaterlandspartei: Die nationale Rechte am Ende des Kaisserreiches p. 176.
  76. Dempster, 2006, pp. 33–34.

Bibliography

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