Battle of Silva Litana

The Battle of Silva Litana was an ambush during the Second Punic War that took place in a forest 75 miles northwest of the Roman city of Ariminum in the spring of 215 BC, or probably in the Spring of 215 BC.[1]The Gallic Boii surprised and destroyed a Roman army of 25,000 men under the consul-elect Lucius Postumius Albinus. Only ten men escaped the ambush, few prisoners were taken and Postumius was killed, decapitated and his skull covered with gold by the Boii. News of the military disaster, coming either several days or months, probably after the election of consuls for 215 BC and after the defeat at Cannae in the fall of 216 BC, triggered a renewed panic in Rome and the Romans postponed military operations against the Gauls until the conclusion of the Second Punic War. Rome decided to focus on defeating Hannibal and sent only two legions to guard against any Gallic attack, while the Boii and Insubres did not attack the Romans to exploit their victory, Cisalpine Gaul remained in relative peace until 207 BC, when Hasdrubal Barca arrived in Cisapline Gaul with his army from Spain.

Battle of Silva Litana
Part of the Second Punic War

Battle of Silva Litana
DateAugust or Autumn 216 BC
Location
Forest of Litana, 75 miles northwest of Ariminum
Result Boii victory
Belligerents
Boii Roman Republic
Commanders and leaders
Unknown Lucius Postumius Albinus †
Strength
Unknown 25,000
Casualties and losses
Unknown 24,990 killed or captured

Background
The peoples of Cisalpine Gaul, 391–192 BC.

Several Gallic tribes, including the Senones, the Boii, the Insubres settled in the Po Valley after having driven out the Etruscans and Umbrians by 390 BC. [2] Hostilities between Rome and Gauls started when the Romans tried to aid the Etruscan city of Clusium against the warlike Senones, who were led by Brennus, [3] the Senones,[3] defeated he Romans at the Battle of Allia between 390 – 387 BC [3] and this led to the partial sack of the Rome, [4][5] before the Gauls were either driven out or bought off.[3][6][7][8] Romans built new stone walls to defend the city of Rome, the Gauls raided Latium in 361, 358, 350 and 349 BC, while the Romans lived in fear of Gallic invasions for several generations. [9] [10] [11] [12]

Roman establish Ager Gallicus

Rome gained the upper hand against the Gauls after winning the Battle of Sentinum in 295 BC against the Etruscans and their Gallic allies, although the Sennones later defeated a Roman army at Arretium in 284 BC, [13] the Romans won the Battle of Lake Vadimo (283 BC) against the Senones, Boii and the Etruscans, the Senones were expelled from their lands, which became Ager Gallicus around the Latin Rights colony of Sena Gallica and the Senones were destroyed as an independent power. [3][14] Romans were at peace with the Gauls for the next 47 years until hostilities with the Boii, who had settled around the Etruscan city of Felsina, [15] broke out. The Romans consolidated their hold south of Ager Gallicus after defeating the Picenites, who had rebelled in 268 BC,[16] and planting colonies at Ariminum in 268 and Firmum in 264.[17] The Boii and the Insubres may have clashed with the Romans between 238 – 236 BC,[18] and they again became hostile after Gaius Flaminius (consul 223 BC) passed the Lex Flaminia de Agro Gallico et Piceno viritim dividundo and Rome began to settle Ager Gallicus and Ager Picenus with Roman settlers after 232 BC.[19][20]

Defeat of the Boii and Insubres

The Boii and the Insubres hired the Gaesatae Gallic mercenaries from Transalpine Gaul and defeated a Roman army in the Battle of Faesulae in 225 BC, [21] but then the Gauls were decisively defeated at Battle of Telamon, which led the Roman subjugation of the Boii, who were already under attack by Roman allies the Veneti, and the Cenomani, in 224 BC. [22] The Romans next defeated Insubres at Accrrae, then in the Battle of Clastidium in 223 BC and their capital Mediolanum in 222 BC, leading to their surrender. Both the Boii and the Insubres were forced to become Roman allies. The Romans planted Latin rights colonies at Cremona and Placentia and fortified Mutina to keep watch over the Gauls in 218 BC, which led to further resentment among the Boii and Insubres.[20]

Second Punic War

Hannibal Barca had planned to invade Italy overland from Spain due to the Roman naval dominance of the Mediterranean Sea making a sea-borne invasion impossible,[note 1] and he hoped that the Carthaginian overland invasion would catch the Romans off guard, [24] who expected Carthage to fight a defensive battle, and forestall the expected Roman invasions of Spain and Africa.[27]

Hannibal had enlisted the cooperation of the Boii and Insubres to ensure provisions and reinforcements awaited him when he reached Italy after crossing the Alps, when the Carthaginian army was at his most vulnerable point due to exhaustion and loss.[28] After the war broke out in the spring of 218 BC, the Boii and the Insubres, partly due to their resentment of Roman occupation of Gallic lands,[20] and perhaps enticed by agents of Hannibal,[29] attacked the Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona, causing the Romans colonists to flee to Mutina, which the Gauls then besieged.[30] This probably occurred in April or May of 218 BC,[31] and this revolt would ultimately force both Rome and Hannibal to change their respective war strategy.

Strategic consequences of the revolt

Rome had mobilized two consular armies in 218 BC, they planned to first send consul Publius Cornelius Scipio with 4 legions (8,000 Roman and 14,000 allied infantry and 600 Roman and 1,600 allied horse)[32] under the escort of 60 quinqueremes to Spain. Scipio was to engage Hannibal either north of the Ebro or east of the Pyrenees or on the Rhône, [33] and after Scipio had occupied Hannibal’s forces, Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus with 4 legions (2 Romans and 2 allied, 8,000 Roman and 16,000 allied infantry and 600 Roman and 1,800 allied horse) under the escort of 160 quinqueremes was to invade Africa and attack Carthage .[34]

Gauls lift siege

The Roman Senate prioritized the defense of Italy over the planned overseas expeditions, and Praetor Peregrinus Lucius Manlius Vulso marched from Ariminium with 600 Roman Horse, 10,000 allied infantry and 1,000 allied cavalry, all taken from Scipio’s army, to aid the besieged Romans.[35][36] This army was ambushed twice on the way, losing 1,200 men and six standards, although they relieved Mutina, the combined Roman army then fell under a loose siege a few miles from Mutina at Tannetum.[37] The Senate now detached one Roman and one allied legion (10,000 men) from the army of Scipio again, and Praetor Urbanus Gaius Atillius Serranus marched to Cisalpine Gaul. As Atillius neared Tannetum, the Gauls retired without battle,[38] and the Romans spent the summer of 218 BC recovering and fortifying Placentia and Cremona.[39] The army of Sepmronius, kept in Rome as a strategic reserve, left Rome in June or July for Sicily.[40] Scipio was forced to raise and train new troops to replace the ones taken from him, [41][42] which delayed his departure for Spain by two-three months. [43] This delay, a direct consequence of the Gallic revolt, indirectly influenced the course of Hannibal’s invasion of Italy.

Hannibal’s arrival in Cisalpine Gaul
A generic representation of the route Hannibal and Publius Scipio took to the Po Valley 218 BC, not to exact scale.

Hannibal had anticipated Rome’s intention to attack Spain and Africa, and he may have planned to defeat Scipio in Spain or Gaul before invading Italy, in doing so securing the Carthaginian possessions in Spain and forestalling the planned Roman invasion of Africa.[44] The Carthaginian army had set out of Cartagena probably in late May or early June,[45] and spent almost three months moving from Cartagena to the Pyrenees, including a 43 day campaign conquering Catalonia, but his intention of defeating the Romans in Spain was foiled because the arrival of Scipio to Spain was delayed because of the Gallic revolt.[45][46] Hannibal reduced his army, abandoned his heavy baggage, and focused on reaching Italy quickly, his streamlined army reached the Rhone in three weeks, forced a passage across the river against Gallic resistance only to find Scipio’s army stationed four days march to the south of his crossing site– another consequence of Scipio’s delayed start from Italy.[47] Hannibal chose not to fight the Romans, [48] but he probably was forced to change his planned route across Alps due to the Roman presence, [49] and his five week crossing of the Alps using this alternate, arduous route caused the loss of the majority of his pack animals and 12,000 t0 20,000 irreplaceable, battle tested, loyal veteran soldiers, who might augmented Hannibal's strength in Italy, another indirect consequence of Scipio’s delayed arrival in Gaul. [50][51] The Carthaginians found no supplies and reinforcements from the Gauls awaiting them after entering Italy, the Gauls joined the Carthaginians only after Hannibal defeated the Taurini. [52][53] Hannibal wintered in Cisalpine Gaul after his victories in the battle of Ticinus and Trebia, and when he marched south in spring of 217 BC, more than half of his army consisted of Gallic recruits.[54]

Prelude

Consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus had attacked the Boii after the departure of Hannibal in 217 BC, but Hannibal’s victory in the Battle of Lake Trasimene forced him to move south to defend Central Italy. [55] The Boii and Insubres were left in peace until the Romans decided to attack both Hannibal and the Gauls in 216 BC. Roman consuls for 216 BC, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro gave a Roman legions to Lucius Postumius Albinus to harry the Gallic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul that had supplied troops to Hannibal's Carthaginian army [56][57] and they probably hoped that with their homeland under attack, the Gauls in Hannibal’s army may desert and move back to Cisalpine Gaul, reducing the Carthaginian army’s strength considerably.[58] Postumius' army strength was increased to two Roman legions and he raised allied troops along the Adriatic coast, raising the number of his soldiers to 25,000 troops.[59]

Opposing armies
Main articles: Roman army of the mid-Republic and Military of Carthage
Detail from the Ahenobarbus relief showing two Roman foot-soldiers from the second century BC

Most male Roman citizens were eligible for military service and would serve as infantry, a better-off minority providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise two legions, each of 4,200 infantry[note 2] and 300 cavalry. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary, served as javelin-armed skirmishers, known as velites. They carried several javelins, which would be thrown from a distance, a short sword, and a 90 centimetres (3.0 ft) shield.[62] The balance were equipped as heavy infantry, with body armour, a large shield and short thrusting swords. They were divided into three ranks, of which the front rank also carried two javelins, while the second and third ranks had a thrusting spear instead. Both legionary sub-units and individual legionaries fought in relatively open order. It was the long-standing Roman procedure to elect two men each year, known as consuls, to each lead an army. An army was usually formed by combining a Roman legion with a similarly sized and equipped legion provided by their Latin allies; allied legions usually had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones.[63][64]

The Gauls

The Gauls were brave, fierce warriors who fought in tribes and clans in massed infantry formation, but lacked the discipline of their Roman and Carthaginian opponents. The Infantry wore no armor, fought naked or stripped to the waist in plaid trousers and a loose cloak, a variety of metal bossed different size and shaped shields made of oak or linden covered with leather[65] and iron slashing swords, both cavalry and Infantry carried spears and javelins for close quarter and ranged combat. [66] Chieftains, Noblemen, and their retainers made up the cavalry, wore helmets and mail, and used thrusting spears and swords.[65]


Battle

Postumius' army invaded Cisalpine Gaul in the spring of 215 BC, and marched through a large forest called Litana by the Gauls towards the Boii strongholds.[67] The Boii had prepared an ambush for the Romans, they cut the trees along the path taken by the Romans in such a way that, unsupported, the trees would remain standing, but if given a slight push they would topple over.[68] The Gauls had somehow managed to conceal their activity from the Romans, or the Roman scouts had failed to detect the Gauls in their vicinity. As the Romans advanced along the road, the Boii secured a perimeter outside their line of advance and pushed over the trees on the outer edges, the trees fell on each other and crashed onto the road from both sides, killing several Roman soldiers and horses and destroying their equipment, while most of the soldiers died under the weight of the trees' trunks and branches and the panicked survivors were slaughtered by the Boii waiting outside the forest.[68] A party of Romans tried to escape across a river, but were captured by the Boii who had already taken the bridge over it, only ten men survived the disaster, and a vast amount of spoils were taken by the Boii.[68] Postumius was killed, his body decapitated and his head taken to a Boii sacred temple, where the skin was scraped off and the bare skull covered with gold,[69] which was used as a cup for drinking by the Boii high priest.[68]

Aftermath

The city of Rome panic stricken after receiving news of this disaster, Rome was now open to a Gallic invasion from the north as there were no legions stationed in Central italy, and their preparations against Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae were just being completed.[68] The Roman Senate ordered aediles to patrol the streets, open shops and disperse any sign of defeatism.[70] Postumius had been elected Roman consul for the third time and in absentia, since he was in command of the Roman legion in Cisalpine Gaul, and the Senate now needed to elect another consul . Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the remaining consul-elect for 215 BC, consoled the Senate by emphasizing the importance of defeating Hannibal, with the Gauls only a secondary priority for Roman strategy.[71] The Senate accordingly garrisoned Arretium with a legion under Preator M. Pomponius, and Gaius Terentius Varro , who had survived the Battle of Cannae and was now a proconsul, was stationed at Ager Picenus with the task of raising and garrisoning the area, both generals were not to conduct any offensive operations.

The Boii did not attack the Roman colonies of Placentia, Cremona in Cisalpine Gaul after their victory, and remained passive until 207 BC. These colonies were able to meet their annual quota of supplying Rome, even in 209 BC, when 18 out of the 30 Roman colonies were unable to supply their required quota of money or soldiers, indicating that the Gauls were not engaged in hostility in Cisalpine Gaul during 216 – 207 BC.[72]

Strategic importance
The locations of Roman legions in 215 BC; of the 18 raised, only 2 were in Iberia, supported by at least 4 Italian legions and Iberian allies.

The Gallic victory and the subsequent Roman decision to keep minimal forces to guard Cisalpine Gaul created an unexpected strategic opportunity for Hasdrubal Barca, who had been ordered to march overland to Italy after destroying the Roman forces stationed in Spain by the Carthaginian Senate in 215 BC. [40] Hasdrubal had attempted to reinforce the Carthaginians in Italy in 217 BC, which was aborted after his navy was beaten In the Battle of Ebro River, [73] and during 216 BC, Hasdrubal was occupied with subduing Iberian rebels based near Gades. Carthage had sent an army under Himilco to guard Spain in 216 BC, and Hasdrubal, in command of an army probably numbering 25,000, was preparing to march to Italy.[74][75]

Hannibal Barca, during 217 – 216 BC, had defeated the Romans in several battles and plundered his way across Central Italy to demonstrate to Rome’s Italian allies Roman inability to protect them as part of his strategy, and after winning at Cannae, Hannibal gained several allies in South Italy, denying the Romans a large part of their source of recruits and supplies, and gaining the same for the Carthaginian armies in Italy, also part of his strategy.[76][77] Hannibal now needed reinforcements to protect his allies and carry the war to the territory of Rome and her remaining allies. The Carthaginian Senate had authorized sending 4,000 Numidian cavalry, 40 elephants and 500 talents to Hannibal,[78] Mago Barca, brother of Hannibal then in Carthage, was authorized to recruiting another army of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, which was to sail to Italy. [1] If Hasdrubal could have brought his army to north Italy in 215 BC, and recruit Ligurians and Gauls to augment his forces, he would have been in a position to attack Central Italy from the north together with the reinforced army of Hannibal advancing from the south while other Carthaginian armies guarded Hannibal's allies in southern Italy, catching Rome and her remaining allies in a pincer movement. Rome probably would not have been able to survive the impact of Hasdrubal and Mago Barca’s armies in Italy, [79] but the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca in the Battle of Ibera not only prevented this, but also diverted the army of Mago Barca to Spain[80] and spared Rome this ordeal. [81]


Notes
    1. Carthage had no bases on the sea coast between the Balearic Islands and Italy, which were dominated by Roman alley Massalia and her colonies,[1] Rome controlled Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily, and thus effectively controlled the coast between Spain and Italy,[23] so a sea voyage would have been more dangerous than a land one. [24] In 218 BC, Rome had mobilized 220 Quinqueremes, while Carthage only had 32 quinqueremes manned in Spain and another 55 in Carthage.[25] The largest fleet Carthage would launch during the war would have 130 quinqueremes, in 212 BC.[26]
    2. This could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances,[60] or, rarely, even more.[61]

    References
    1. Gabriel 2011, pp. 90.
    2. Strabo, Geography, V.1.6.
    3. Florus, The Epitome of Roman History, Book 1, ch. 13
    4. Livy, The Rise of Rome, p. 329
    5. Lane Fox, The Classical World, p. 283
    6. Livy, The Rise of Rome, p. 330
    7. Appian, History of Rome, The Gallic Wars, §1
    8. Pennell 2004, CH9para2.
    9. Cornell 1995, p. 325
    10. Liv. 7 26
    11. Polybius. 2.18
    12. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 4
    13. Polybius, The Histories, 2.19–20
    14. Polybius, The Histories, 2.19–20
    15. Williams, J. H. C. (2001). Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy (illustrated ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 201–202. ISBN 978-0-19-815300-9.
    16. Boatwright, Mary T; Gargola, Daniel J; Talbert, Richard JA (2004). The Romans: From Village to Empire. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-19-511876-6. By the 260s, few, if any, communities in Etruria, Umbria and Picenum possessed any real independence. The Picentes revolted in 269.
    17. Staveley, ES (1989). "Rome and Italy in the Early Third Century". In Walbank, Frank William (ed.). The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VII: the Hellenistic World: Part 2: The Rise of Rome to 220 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 425. Certainly, steps designed to consolidate her hold in the north-east followed this incident in quick succession: the foundation in 268 of the Latin colony of Ariminum .... the annexation of the whole Picentine land save for ... Ancona and ... Asculum; the transportation of large numbers of Picentes to the ager Picentinus on the west coast, and finally in 264 the planting of a second large Latin colony on the coast at Firmum.
    18. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 7-10
    19. Polybius, The Histories, 2.21.-9
    20. Goldworthy 2000, p. 139.
    21. Polybius, Histories 2:25
    22. Polybius, Histories 2:23–24
    23. Daly 2002, pp. 13.
    24. Miles 2011, pp. 236.
    25. Hoyos 2003, pp. 100.
    26. Lazenby 1978, pp. 31.
    27. Lazenby 1978, pp. 29.
    28. Lancel 1998, pp. 64.
    29. Lazenby 1978, p. 31-32, 51.
    30. Bagnall 1999, pp. 158.
    31. Gabriel 2011, pp. 107.
    32. Lazenby, J.F., Hannibal's War, p 71 ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
    33. Daly 2002, p. 11.
    34. Lazenby, J.F., Hannibal's War, p 71 ISBN 0-8061-3004-0
    35. Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p 151 ISBN 0-304-36642-0
    36. Lazenby 1978, p. 50.
    37. Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p 151 ISBN 0-304-36642-0
    38. Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p 152 ISBN 0-304-36642-0
    39. Gabriel 2011, p. 50.
    40. Hoyos 2003, pp. 103.
    41. Lazenby 1978, p. 51.
    42. Bath 1981, p. 45.
    43. Miles 2011, pp. 262.
    44. Hoyos 2003, p. 113.
    45. Gabriel 2011, pp. 106.
    46. Hoyos 2003, pp. 112.
    47. Lazenby 1978, pp. 36.
    48. Bath 1981, p. 46.
    49. Lancel 1998, pp. 72.
    50. Hoyos 2003, pp. 106.
    51. Lancel 1998, p. 71.
    52. Bath 1981, p. 50.
    53. Baker 1999, p. 97.
    54. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 30
    55. Polybius 3.88.3
    56. Livy 2006, p. 162.
    57. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 33
    58. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 34
    59. Gabriel 2011, pp. 165.
    60. Bagnall 1999, p. 23.
    61. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 287.
    62. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 48.
    63. Bagnall 1999, pp. 22–25.
    64. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 50.
    65. Daly 2002, p. 103.
    66. Bath 1981, p. 29.
    67. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 35
    68. Livy 2006, p. 163.
    69. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 30
    70. Livy 2006, p. 164.
    71. Livy 2006, pp. 162–164.
    72. Eckstein, Arthur M., Senate and General, p 43
    73. Goldsworthy, Adrian, The Fall of Carthage, p 248 ISBN 0-304-36642-0
    74. Goldsworthy 2006, p. 250.
    75. Bagnall 1999, p. 204.
    76. Gabriel 2011, p. 96.
    77. Baker 1999, p. 86.
    78. Baker 1999, p. 43.
    79. Scullard 1930, pp. 47–48.
    80. Lazenby 1978, pp. 128.
    81. Zimmermann 2015, p. 291.

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