Bamar nationalism
Bamar nationalism (Burmese: ဗမာအမျိုးသားရေးဝါဒ) is a form of ethnic nationalism which promotes the cultural identity and interests of the Bamar people of Myanmar.
History
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Myanmar has been regarded as one of the most powerful countries in Southeast Asia. During the Pagan Empire and the Taungoo and Konbaung dynasties, it was considered second only to China in regional strength.[1]
Burmese nationalism initially aimed to overthrow British rule. The British allied with ethnic minorities against the Bamar majority, often using ethnic minorities to dominate the Bamar people. Nationalism grew in British Burma; British support of the minorities against the Burmese left them ethnically and religiously concentrated around the idea of a unified Burmese state ruled by the Bamar people, with Theravada Buddhism the dominant religion. Burmese nationalism became more restrictive and homogeneous.[2] As the British Empire began to retreat from Burma, Burmese nationalists turned against the minorities they considered unfaithful to Burmese nationhood; this led to the ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar.[3][4]
Relations with other ethnic groups
Bamar nationalism was fueled by Myanmar's history (when minorities allied with Britain against Burma), the ongoing internal conflict, and its connection to Buddhist nationalism; most Bamars are Theravada Buddhists.[2] There has been an increase of Buddhist Bamar chauvinism has increased since the COVID-19 pandemic.[5]
Christians
Christian ethnic groups such as the Karen and Chin and individual Christians from other ethnic groups such as the Kachin have been the targets of discrimination by Bamar nationalists since the period of British rule. A sense of racial segregation then increased, as Britain favored minorities such as the Karen, Kachin, and Chin (who converted to Christianity in large numbers);[6][7] the Karen were favored due to their acceptance of British rule and hostility to the Buddhist Bamars since the First Anglo-Burmese War.[8][9][10]
During World War II, the Burma Independence Army supported the Japanese in persecuting the country's minorities: the Rohingyas, Karens and Kachins. The Bamars participated in massacres of Christian minorities, and many Christians (notably the Karens) joined the British in fighting against the Japanese invaders.[11] The Kachin Ranger group also fought under the British, clashing with Burmese and Japanese forces.[12] This segregated mainstream Christian minorities from the majority-Buddhist Bamar population, and was a catalyst for later ethnic wars.[13]
Karen exclusion from the Panglong Agreement, the dismissal of Karen officers from the Tatmadaw, and the Karen desire for independence led them into an insurgency against the Burmese government, which had begun to persecute ethnic Karens (including barring them from working in Burma).[14] Attacks on ethnic Karens by the Burmese regime increased after the overthrow of the civilian government by Ne Win, who supported Buddhist Bamar nationalism to deter other ethnic nationalism. The conflict became increasingly sectarian, with Bamar Buddhists clashing with Karen and Kachin Christians to gain control of minority territories despite attempts to reduce sectarian and racial tensions.[15][16]
The Kachins joined the anti-government insurgency after the collapse of the civilian government, and were equally targeted by the Burmese government.[17] Peace efforts have been largely futile.[18] The majority-Christian Chin people, relatively close relatives of the Kachins, have been targeted by Bamar nationalists less frequently than the Karens and Kachins.[19][20]
The Holy See and Myanmar established official relations in 2017 in the hope of de-escalating the persecution of Christians, which continued into 2018.[21] In 2019, Christians celebrating Christmas were attacked by a Bamar-nationalist Buddhist mob.[22]
Mon people
The indigenous Mon people, who live in southern Burma, have a close linguistic relationship with the Vietnamese and Khmers; all three groups speak Austroasiatic languages. The Mons' relationship with the Bamars has fluctuated; they had fought to regain their independent Hanthawaddy Kingdom from the Bamars, who are culturally close but linguistically different. Siam often supported Mon insurrections against Burma as part of its buffer-zone policy.[23]
The Mon Hanthawaddy was finally conquered after the Konbaung–Hanthawaddy War.[24] The Bamars' forced-assimilation attempt led to a fall in the Mon population, and the Mons sided with Britain after the British conquest. The British supported the Mon de-Burmanization attempt, and national awareness of the group increased.[25] The Mons later became hostile to the British administration, and later turned against the Burmese government. Bamar nationalists have aimed since the 1950s to Burmanize the Mon minority, who have been forced to join the Tatmadaw.[26]
Muslims
King Bayinnaung (1550–1581) restricted, but did not otherwise persecute, his Muslim subjects.[27] In 1559, after conquering Pegu (present-day Bago), Bayinnaung banned dhabihah (ritual slaughter); this prevented Muslims from eating halal goat and chicken. He also banned Eid al-Adha and Qurbani, regarding the killing of animals in the name of religion as cruel.[28][29]
During the 17th century, Indian Muslims in Arakan were massacred. They had settled with Shah Shuja, who fled India after losing a Mughal war of succession. The Arakan pirate Sandathudama (1652–1687) had allowed Shuja and his followers to settle there, but a dispute between Sandatudama and Shuja drove Shuja to an unsuccessful rebellion. Although Sandathudama killed most of Shuja's followers, Shuja escaped the massacre.[30][31][32][33][34][35][36] King Alaungpaya (1752–1760) also prohibited Muslims from practicing cattle dhabihah.[37]
Myanmar experienced an influx of Indian immigrants, many of whom were Muslim, under British rule. Perceived favoritism towards the Indians over the Bamars by the British government inflamed tension between the groups;[38] anti-Indian unrest alternated with anti-Muslim unrest. The 1930 Rangoon riots were sparked by a labour issue at the Yangon port, which led to the massacre of Indian Muslim workers. Order was only restored when the Cameron Highlanders were sent into to suppress the riots.[38][39]
During World War II, many Bamars supported the Japanese invasion; Japanese antagonism toward Muslims led to massacres. The Japanese destroyed Panglong, a Chinese Muslim township, with Bamar support.[40][41] They also helped the Bamars crush the less-armed Rohingya resistance, forcing many Rohingyas to flee Burma.[42][43][44][45]
Persecution intensified after the establishment of a military junta by Ne Win in 1962, and Muslims were expelled from the army.[46] Muslim communities which segregated themselves from the Buddhist majority faced greater difficulties than those who integrated.[46] Rohingyas faced harsher repression, losing the right to acquire Burmese citizenship under the country's 1982 Citizenship Law.[47]
The destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban triggered religious and racial conflict. Anti-Muslim pamphlets, most notably The Fear of Losing One's Race, were distributed by monks in 2001.[48] Anti-Muslim riots broke out in Taungoo on 15 May 2001, resulting in the death of about 200 Muslims, the destruction of eleven mosques and the torching of over 400 houses. That day, about 20 Muslims who were praying in the Han Tha mosque were killed; some were beaten to death by pro-junta forces. Lieutenant General Win Myint, third secretary of the State Peace and Development Council and deputy home and religious minister, arrived in Taungoo two days later; a curfew was imposed until 12 July.[49] Buddhist monks demanded the destruction of the Han Tha mosque in retaliation for the destruction in Afghanistan.[50] On 18 May, the Han Tha mosque and the Taungoo railway-station mosque were razed by SPDC junta bulldozers.[50] The mosques in Taungoo remained closed in May 2002, and Muslims have been forced to worship in their homes; local Muslim leaders reported continuing harassment. After two days of violence (which ended with military intervention), many local Muslims moved from Taungoo to nearby towns; some moved to Yangon.[50]
A number of anti-Muslim riots have erupted since the 2010s as a response to growing Muslim threats, often with substantial casualties.[51][52][53] The Islamophobic, anti-Rohingya 969 Movement is led by U Wirathu, who has been compared to Osama bin Laden.[54]
The Rohingyas have experienced intense persecution (including ethnic cleansing) since 2016, with Bamar nationalism playing a significant role.[55] Bamar nationalists consider the Rohingya Bengalis, immigrants from Bangladesh. Violence and repression of Rohingyas are widespread, and Rohingyas are increasingly displaced.[56]
Ko Ni, a Muslim lawyer and a friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, was assassinated in 2017 by a gunman linked to Bamar nationalism. His assassination was thought to be related to his sympathy for the Rohingyas.[57]
Rakhine
With the Rohingya, the Rakhine people have been living in Rakhine (also known as Arakan, as part of the Theravada Kingdom of Mrauk U). The kingdom was conquered by the Konbaung dynasty and incorporated into Burma, where an ethnic genocide forced 35,000 Arakanese to flee from Burma to the British Raj.[58]
The Arakanese were hostile to the Bamars and the Rohingyas, whom they saw as aliens who destroyed their independence. During World War II, the Arakanese supported the Japanese and resisted Bamar nationalism.[59] The Rakhines, Rohingyas, and Bamars are now hostile to each other;[60] according to a Rakhine politician, "We are ... the victims of Muslimisation and Burmese chauvinism".[61]
Bamar nationalism led to conflict at the end of the 20th century and intensified during the 2010s, with the establishment of the anti-government Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.[62] The Rakhine resent the increased influence of the Rohingya.[63]
Shan State
The Shan State is one of Myanmar's most diversified regions. The Shan people are the most numerous and have strong ties to the other Tai peoples: the Thais and Laotians. The Shan people moved to Myanmar after the Mongol invasions of Burma, and remained there after forming an independent state.[64] Since the 16th-century rise of the Burmese Empire, its rulers barred settlers from taking Shan territory and left it alone; Bamar nationalists initially did not see the Shans as a threat. The Shans contributed troops to fight for the Burmese Empire, notably against the British during the Anglo-Burmese Wars.[64] The British acknowledged Shan independence, granting the region full autonomy as the Shan States and the later Federated Shan States. Shan nationalism did not develop separately, but became a force reinforcing Bamar nationalism. The Shans participated in the Panglong Agreement and became part of Burma. Aung San's assassination, however, ensured that the agreement was never honoured.[65]
Although the Shan people initially did not join the Burmese insurgency, Ne Win's 1962 coup d'état and the arrest of Sao Shwe Thaik sparked tensions between the Shans and the Burmese.[66] The Burmese government began to persecute the Shans, whose resistance became an obstacle for Bamar nationalists in achieving a homogenous nation.[67]
In addition to the Shans, other ethnic groups in the region include the Ta'ang, Kokang Chinese and Wa; all have been targeted by Bamar nationalists due to cultural differences.[68][69] Only the Was have a nominal peace with Burma, often fragile due to the United Wa State Army's supplying other ethnic rebels and its drug trade.[70][71]
Others
Burmese Chinese and Indians have been part of conflicts with the Burmese government, which has contributed to the rise of Burmese nationalism. Burmese nationalists have been particularly hostile to Indians, partly due to the British colonial government which encouraged Indian migration.[72] The Burmese Chinese were a smaller migrant group, and anti-Chinese sentiment only began to increase during the 1960s; the 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Burma led to an exodus of ethnic Chinese.[73] Anti-Chinese unrest also occurred during the period of British rule, however.[74] The Chinese ultimately armed themselves against the Burmese government, founding the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army,[75] and the Indians returned to India to escape Burmese nationalism.[76]
Causes
Scholars, analysts, and dissidents have noted the Bamar lack of unity and sympathy with other ethnic groups, which may have bolstered ultra-nationalism in Myanmar.[77]
Economics
Although Myanmar has been an empire, the country had a largely-agrarian society. Despite its borders with India and China, it was not very active in international trade compared with other Southeast Asian nations.[78] Myanmar has never been an economic power.[79][80][81] Even after the fall of Ne Win, the junta remained; economic freedom was severely limited, and the country's economy was on a par in Asia with North Korea.[82] Economic restrictions were lifted after reforms in 2011 and Myanmar has shared the economic boom; however, internal problems have hindered the country's potential and cut off development opportunities in many undeveloped parts of the country.[83] Although Myanmar is rich in resources, nationalism is its driving force.[84]
Politics
Throughout the country's history, politics in Myanmar have been characterized by a lack of democratic institutions and dependence on the will of a leader. Since Burma is surrounded by a large number of sometimes-antagonistic ethnic groups, the country has often resorted to military conquest and nationalism for security; the Burmese–Siamese wars and its conquest of Northeast India and Laos are examples.[85][86] Burmese nationalism has been an internal tool as well, often used by the government to control natural resources and ethnic minorities.[87][88] The Tatmadaw lacks civilian control, making Bamar nationalism more militaristic and violent; civilian leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, have been forced to bow to the military.[89]
Ethnic antipathy
Compared to other Southeast Asian nations, Myanmar lacks a history of cultural assimilation; assimilation began only under the Konbaung dynasty, when the Mons were Burmanized.[90][91] Burmese nationalism developed under British rule, when racial and religious segregation was practiced.[90] Minority resistance led to increased Bamar nationalism, illustrated by the present-day Rakhine conflict.[92][63]
Religious discord
Myanmar is predominantly Bamar and Theravada Buddhist; with over 20 million non-Bamars, however, religious sectarianism exists.[20] Bamar leaders promote cultural homogeneity with religion, carrying out reprisals against Christian groups such as the Karens, Kachins and Chins; Muslim groups such as the Rohingyas, Kameins and Panthays, and the segment of the Shan population which observes Tai folk religion.[93][94]
The term "Buddhist nationalism" may be misleading, evidenced by Bamar aggression against primarily-Theravada ethnic groups such as the Arakanese (Rakhine), Indians and Mon; the mainly-Mahayana Chinese, and the minority Karen Buddhists.[95][96] Although this is overlooked by Western observers in favour of an Islamophobic narrative which emphasizes the Rohingya,[95] reports of ethnic Bamar supremacism have led to charges of racial segregation.[97]
See also
Myanmar portal
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