Abdi House raid

The UNOSOM effort to capture General Aideed following the attack on the Pakistanis in June and early July had repeatedly ended in failure.[13] The mounting frustration from these failures led UNOSOM II officials to resolve to deal a severe blow to his S.N.A. power base.[9][6] The "Abdi House" was well known to have been holding regular clan meetings for the Habr Gidr and became a target, as the S.N.A. was primarily comprised of members from that clan.[6][9][13] In the weeks following the attack on the Pakistanis UNOSOM had, via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu, make the clear distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habir Gidir, but only wanted to capture Aideed.[14]

Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Hassan Awales home, a residence belonging to one of Aideeds highest ranking lieutenants and Interior Minister, began on July 7, 1993.[15]

In an unprecedented decision that would break the mold of previous UNOSOM II raids in Mogadishu, no warning would be given, as eliminating the "S.N.A. command center" and its inhabitants depended entirely on maintaining the element of total surprise.[10][16]

According to Mark Bowden, Turkish commander of UNOSOM II, Gen. Cevik Bir and his deputy U.S. Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery had wanted an attack without any warning in order to totally decapitate the leadership of the S.N.A.[9][13] The head of the UNOSOM II operation in Mogadishu, retired U.S. Admiral Johnathan Howe, had proposed issuing a warning or at the very least storming the villa with ground forces to prevent civilian casualties.[9] This was rejected by UNOSOM commanders who explained that such an approach would expose American troops to an unacceptable risk of losses, as the 10th Mountain Division did not possess the capability to perform the kind of "snatch-and-grab" tactics used by Delta Force.[9] By not issuing a warning UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that concerns for American casualties overruled concerns for Somali civilians.[6] As Head of UNOSOM II, Howe could have overruled the military, but chose not to and effectively endorsed the departure from previous "peacekeeping" practices.[6]

UNOSOM command regarded the planned assault as, "a legitimate defensive action, one that would undermine Aideeds support in the Habr Gidr clan" and feared that the Italian contingent of the force had been making a secret unilateral agreement with Aideed, which ran the risk of increasing his support if completed.[17]

Several U.N. sources claim that during the planning phase of the raid, the Pakistanis had been asked to surround the house so those meeting inside could be forced out and arrested.[1] They also claim that Pakistan had refused, leading American commanders to conclude that they had no option but to destroy the villa and kill the occupants.[1]

The White House would directly sign off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did.[10][18][19] The strike would be overseen first hand by the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Thomas M. Montgomery, who would be seated in one of the Cobras participating in the strike.[20][21] According to officials involved in the decision making, senior American and U.N. military personal were aware that the attack would mark a watershed moment for UNSOM II and agonized over whether to commit to it for more than two weeks.[1]

The planned surprise attack would be unique and historic, in that it would the first attack where the target would be actual Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg as, "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".[1][22]

A conference of high ranking elders, intellectuals, businessmen and clansmen of the Habr Gidr along with prominent members of other Somali clans such as the Ogadeni, Dir, Majerteen, Sheikhal and Murosade, was to take place in order to discuss how to respond to a peace initiative from Admiral Johnathan Howe.[23][24][11][6] A handful of the elders, including the most senior of the Habr Gidr, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, had met with Howe the day preceding for preliminary talks and Howe had requested of them to look for a peaceful resolution to the then four week long war between the Aideeds S.N.A. and UNOSOM.[14][24][25]

This request prompted the unusually high profile July 12, 1993, gathering.[3][24][23][25]

Abdi "Qeybdiids" Awales villa was selected for the talks, as its possessed a large room on the second floor capable of holding a gathering of over a hundred people.[25] The meeting had been publicized in Mogadishu's newspapers as a peace conference the day before and an American war correspondent in Mogadishu who was a witness of the raid, Scott Peterson, corroborates the Somali account that a group of elders had gathered to discuss to how to end the violence between the SNA and U.N. forces.[3][11][22][12]

A C.I.A. informant inside the clan passed intelligence that a meeting was to take place and present among the gathered would be some of those who had part taken in the June 5, 1993, attack.[15][9]

Aideed himself did not approve of the meeting taking place, as his role as clan leader was being held in question.[3][6][26]

He was allegedly tipped off that something would happen to the conference a few hours prior, either by his own intelligence network or by the Italian element of UNOSOM II, who were allegedly sympathetic to him.[20]

Following confirmation of the codeword "Michigan", an armada of 17 helicopters took off and surrounded the villa in minutes.[27][28][29]

Around 10:18 ^am a C.I.A. informant named Omar Hassan Ganay walked out of the meeting to the main gate of the compound in full view of the waiting attack helicopters that had just begun encircling the villa, wearing an arranged set of clothing as a strike signal.[3]

Seconds later, following visual confirmation of the target and without any warning, six AH-1 Cobras and four OH-58 Kiowas launched a total of sixteen TOW missiles and 2,200 rounds of 20 mm caliber cannon fire into the gathering for a total of six minutes.[23][28][30][15][21]

The Cobras launched the TOWs into the second floor of the villa, where the conference was taking place, then specifically targeted the roof in an attempt to crush the occupants and the stairwells of the building to prevent any escape.[23][28]

"Our orders were to destroy the conference room on the second floor where everybody was supposed to be meeting, then we were to destroy the staircase in the back of the house so no one could get away...I was flying security for battle position one and my job was to wax anybody if they tried to leave the compound, or if they came outside and tried to shoot at us. Then I was supposed to destroy the front gate of the compound so that the infantry could get it."

Chief Warrant Officer Christopher Roben[27]

Moments before Abdi "Qeybdiid" had just begun addressing the crowd of about 80 to 90 Somalis that had gathered on the second story of the villa.[9] Present among them were prominent sheikhs, former judges, famous poets, professors, and intellectuals who represented the most respected and best-educated of the Habr Gidr.[9][28] Most notably, the Habr Gidr's most senior elder Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, over 90 years old, was instantly killed in the first TOW missile volley along with other elders, as they were all directly sitting against the walls of the conference room.[9][28][7][14] A highly regarded poet, Moallim Soyan, would also die in the strike.[7][31] Other eminent Somalis from other clans were also in attendance.[11]

"What Farah saw and heard was a flash of light and a violent crack. He stood and took one step forward and heard the whooosh! of a second missile. There was another flash and explosion. He was thrown to the floor. Thick smoke filled the room. He tried to move forward but his way was blocked by bodies, a bloody pile of men and parts of men a meter high...Those who survived the first blast were feeling along the wall, groping for the door when the second missile had exploded. The air was thick with dark smoke and smelled of powder, blood, and burned flesh. Farah found the stairs, stood, and had taken one step down when a third missile exploded, disintegrating the staircase. He tumbled to the first floor. He sat up stunned, and felt himself for broken bones and wet spots...There was another explosion above him. Then another and another."

Excerpt from Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down[32]

Among those killed were multiple women who had been serving tea for gathering, children who had happened to be playing in the villas courtyard and civilians who had been hit by stray 20mm rounds.[23][22]

Aideed was not present at the meeting.[28][9][33]

At 10:23 ^am, one minute after the Cobras had stopped their assault on the villa, three of the waiting Black Hawk helicopters landed in the vicinity of the decimated building. One of the Black Hawks, containing the support platoon tasked with covering the assault platoon, landed on the roof of the French Embassy, which provided a vantage point of the villa.[15] According to the 22nd Infantry Regiment, a primary participant in the raid, the assault platoon then made its way from the street into the compound and into the house to search for surviving "S.N.A. leadership" and any "valuable intelligence"[15] Two other separate Black Hawks, landed on the street in front of the meeting and troops from them quickly streamed out and set up a cordon around the house.[15]

Helicopters participating in the raid would drop a total of 22 CS gas grenades to chase away gathering crowds of onlookers.[17]

An American AH-1 Cobra flies over crowd of Somalis gathering around Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awales villa

According to a Somali survivor, American troops stormed the compound after the strike and killed 15 survivors at close range with pistols, a charge American commanders would deny.[3][25] One pilot claimed that the troops on the ground had engaged in sporadic gunfights with some of the survivors (the entire assault was filmed from one of the helicopters but has never been publicly seen).[27]

The U.N. account detailed in the "Blue Book", claims that it took nine minutes for troops to clear the area, search the villa, and depart, all while leaving earlier than expected, marking the "Abdi House Attack" as the fastest operation that had been conducted by UNOSOM II.[21]

In the two and half years since the civil war had come to Mogadishu, Bloody Monday represented the deadliest loss from a single attack the city had seen.[3] CNN had received footage of the raid from a Somali cameraman, but it was deemed too gruesome to show on air.[3]

"You could really feel the savagery of this action...there was a lot of blood shed and it was vicious, like an animal attack."

A Somali survivor recounts during a 1999 interview with Scott Peterson in Mogadishu[3]

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, there were 54 Somalis killed and 161 wounded but this was entirely based on a survey of the dead and injured at two large hospitals in Mogadishu.[34] The actual casualty count is possibly higher as only two medical facilities in the entire city were canvassed, and since many Somalis follow the Islamic tradition of burying the dead immediately.[29][30]

The Somalis claimed 73 people were killed and 200 wounded, another charge which American and U.N. officials denied.[20][29] American war correspondent Scott Peterson who was present on the scene of the attack claimed that the raid was far deadlier than U.S. and U.N. officials acknowledged.[30][29] Many of those who would die in the strike were vocal supporters of reconciliation and negotiations with UNOSOM.[19][14]

UNOSOM commanders initially only claimed that 7 Somalis had been killed, all men and all combatants.[35] UNOSOM II never produced evidence to substantiate their claim that the "Abdi House" was a legitimate military target where no civilians were present.[6] Days later, UNOSOM would drop leaflets over Mogadishu proclaiming, "The SNA officials who were killed were responsible for the deaths of six innocent Somalis. The SNA said women and children were killed, but that was pure propaganda."[14]

Former National Security Adviser to the Clinton Administration, Anthony Lake commented while being interviewed in 1998 by Mark Bowden that the raid "was not specifically designed to kill people."[9]

The ruins of Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awales villa

"I guess we created trouble for those who followed."

First Sergeant Buckley of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry reflecting on his participation in the raid[17]

The raid was the first time the U.N. forces in Somalia had deliberately targeted people instead of buildings or armaments caches, marking a decisive turning point in what had until then been a low-level intensity conflict.[1]

Many Somalis, U.N. personnel and humanitarian organizations believed that the strike had marked an unnecessary escalation that had devolved the U.N. peacekeepers into yet just another belligerent faction involved in the Somali Civil War, fears that were exacerbated by comments from U.N. officials who publicly warned that UNOSOM had a list of ten more "command and control" centers to be hit in a similar fashion.[3][8][36][37]

To the Habr Gidr, including the former moderates and even other clans that had formerly opposed them, the attack marked a declaration of outright war from the United States and signified the point where a diplomatic solution to the "Somalia problem" had become inconceivable.[1][9][38][39][4]

To thousands of cities residents, Aideed's anti-UNOSOM rhetoric warning of an ever growing neocolonialist and imperialist international intervention had been validated, which greatly enabled him to consolidate and expand power across the divisive clan lines of war torn Mogadishu, making the city far more dangerous for international troops to operate in.[9][1][36][18] In the view U.S. special envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley the incident, “caused a number of non–Habr Gidr to sympathize, and even join forces with, the SNA” and furthermore increased “Aideed’s support among those Habr Gidr who had not previously been with him.”[40][4]

Sign at an anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting the attack

"Before July 12th, the US would have been attacked only because of association with the UN, but the US was never singled out until after July 12th"

U.S. Envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley[6]

The attack was designed to destroy Aideed’s power base, but instead it counterproductively resulted in an increased support for Aideed and intensified opposition to U.S. and UN forces.[17][40][19] The raid massively undercut the growing internal opposition in the Habr Gidr to Aideed and solidified his leadership.[6][41]

A 2004 U.S. military sanctioned case study of the operation in Somalia would comment on the unprecedented raid, saying that the, "Liberalization of the rules of engagement mirrored the shift to combat operations." [17]

The S.N.A would seize on to assault to and successfully portray a "David and Goliath" struggle between patriots and foreign invaders to the residents of Mogadishu.[39] The events of Bloody Monday would lead Aideed to make the decision to specifically target American soldiers for the first time and would result in the August 8, 1993, killings of U.S. troops that would push President Clinton to send in Delta Force and the Rangers to capture him.[10][21][19]

The reason for the meeting, how many people were killed and even the very inhabitants of the house at the time is disputed by UNOSOM officials who claimed that the conference was in reality a gathering of an S.N.A. war council at a major "command and control center", and that operation was a successful strike.[20][21] Among the claims UNOSOM officials put forward were:

• ‘‘...no innocent civilians were injured in the attack" and ‘‘All were adult males. All were armed.’’[29]
• Johnathan Howe would claim, “There was no evidence of non-combatant casualties from the raid itself” and that Operation Michigan had been "flawless".[23] He would also go on to say that the footage recorded by the Somali cameraman was "suspect".[3][21]
• Maj. Leann Swieczkowski, an army spokeswoman, said that the photographs taken inside the house proved that it was an S.N.A. "forward command center," although UNOSOM later claimed that evidence of Somali casualties had not been recorded because the U.N. military photographer's camera had broken.[11]
• An after action report on Somalia prepared by Montgomery and others, claimed that among those killed were a number of top financiers and military planners, including the overall planner of the June 5th ambush of Pakistani soldiers.[21] Montgomery would later concede that elders were in fact killed, but that they had been combatants.[3]
• No warning had been given to the occupants because the "Abdi House" was a purely military facility.[6]

According to the U.N., "The raid was carried out on the basis of information that meetings would be held at the center, and that the militia leaders would likely attend." [42] The exact target of the operation is disputed, as U.N. officials later claimed Aideed rarely attended the meetings and was not the target.[35][40] Some of the American helicopter pilots involved in the raid claimed that Aideed had actually been the informant.[27]

The strike also caused an outcry among U.N. civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section.[8][43][1] Ann Wright, the top U.N. justice official in Somalia tasked helping rebuild the decimated police force and judicial system, would go on to write a memo to Johnathan Howe stating:

“We believe as a matter of policy, short prior notice of the destruction of a building with humans inside must be given.  From the legal, moral and human rights perspective, we counsel against conducting military operations that give no notice of attack to occupants of buildings.”

“...a deliberate attack meant to kill the occupants without giving all the occupants in the building a chance to surrender is nothing less than murder committed in the name of the United Nations.”

Ann Wright, Chief of the UNOSOM Justice Division[8][44][25]

She would further go on to state that it “...undercuts U.N. credibility when we can not with accuracy state how many persons were killed or injured, who they were and why they were in the facility.”[45][21][8] At least nine U.N. civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or just left their posts in protest, several of those who stayed on commenting that the United Nations had relinquished its "moral authority" in its war against Aideed.[1]

Poster at an anti U.N. protest in Mogadishu depicting the Italians split with Howe over the escalation of force in UNSOM II

The attack exposed deep rifts among states contributing troops to UNOSOM II, primarily the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aideed.[46][43][47][48] The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack against the Habr Gidr threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.[49][50][51] Fabio Fabbri, then Italian defence minister, would remark, "A choice of this nature, with its extremely high risk, indeed certainty, that human lives will be lost is shared neither by public opinion nor by parliament in our country."[44]

According to American envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley, following the raid, "...Italy, France, Zimbabwe and other contingents of UNOSOM, on orders from home, stopped participating in anti-Aideed operations, thus further weakening an already lame U.N. command authority. Much of the humanitarian activity stopped and various NGOs voiced their criticisms of both the United Nations and the United States."[39] A Pakistani officer noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed.[44] The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on 12 July led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8 killings of American soldiers.[8][52]

The conclusion of the independent inquiry the U.N. had setup into the massacre was so controversial that U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali personally asked for the commission to revise their report, to which they refused.[3] The U.N. allowed only the envoys of the 15th member Security Council view the report on the top floor of the headquarters in New York and they could only view a single copy of the report, chained to a desk, with photocopying or photos forbidden.[3]

"For the first time in Somalia there has been a killing under the flag of humanitarianism."

Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders[3]

Multiple relief and human rights organizations condemned the attack, and in Mogadishu the U.N. command was delivered copies of the Geneva Convention, specifically in relation to attacks on civilians and proportional retaliation.[53][3][54] Human Rights Watch went as far as to claim that the attack "looked like mass murder."[11]

A significant amount of the international press on the incident was primarily focused on the deaths of four journalists—Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia—who were killed by an enraged mob when they arrived to cover the incident.[55][56][9] Because of the killings most western news organizations completely withdrew from Somalia which greatly contributed to the lack of any substantial press during the Battle of Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993.[35]

Michael McDonaugh, director of Concern Worldwide an Irish humanitarian organization in Somalia, would remark soon after, "There's an anger directed against all foreigners now...more than ever before, we're all targets. How can we work?" [35]

Across the West, "Bloody Monday" caught the most press and attention in Italy:[46]

• The surprise assault became front page news across the country and the newspaper representing Italian Catholic bishops, Avvenire, referred to it as a "vile American raid." [35]
• Another paper, La Repubblica, would call it "...incomprehensible and unjustifiable".[46]
• The Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano would state that raid, "...that the original objective of the mission has been abandoned or momentarily forgotten. This act of reprisal was a real massacre." [57][33]

In Rome, Somalis would take to the streets in protest.[48] Achille Occheto, head of Italy's Democratic Party of the Left, would publicly decry it as a, "useless and irresponsible act of war" and said that Italian troops should withdraw if the mission was not exclusively humanitarian.[52][57]

In Germany, the Social Democrats would push against Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s offer to send a contingent of 1,600 German soldiers to Somalia, and pushed for it should be withdrawn.[29]

In Washington, Sen. Robert C. Byrd would break with his fellow Democrats and call for the U.S. troops in Somalia to, ‘‘pack up and go home.’’[29]

In London, England the American embassy saw protests and a group of people were arrested in the House of Commons for attempting to unfurl a banner and shouting, "Get the American murderers out of Somalia!"[58]

"Yusuf knew the bile on Aidid's radio station was nonsense, about how the UN and the Americans had come to colonize Somalia and wanted to burn the Koran. But in the months since the Abdi House attack he had come to share the popular anger towards American forces."

Excerpt from Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down[32]

The unprecedented strike invoked outrage in Somalia.[59][35][38] The atmosphere in Mogadishu became very tense and humanitarian work in the city more or less came to a halt as the risk towards foreigners, especially Americans, had become the worst it had ever been since the start of the intervention.[60][47] On the afternoon of July 12, 1993, the S.N.A. announced that it would, "continue to fight until the last colonial solider of the United Nations leaves."[14] In the following days parts of the city would turn into "near anarchy" and UNOSOM positions all over Mogadishu would repeatedly be directly attacked.[58][61]

The outrage was so significant that even Somali opponents of Aideed could not publicly approve of the raid, and after "Bloody Monday" UNOSOM had, "...no chance in counting on the support of other politico-military groups, even those opposed to Aydid’s."[14] Aideed was now better able to count on the neutrality or even support of groups that had previously been unfavorable to him, as many Somalis from all walks of life felt that the "peacekeepers" had crossed a significant line.[14] Leaflets calling for reprisals against American soldiers and warning of a coming battle against international troops were spread across Mogadishu.[58][61] In some parts of the city armed gangs had formed going from agency to agency inquiring about the location of American citizens and the Somali C.I.A. informant who had signaled for the strike was assassinated.[3]

Sign at an anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting "Bloody Monday"

"It's absolutely incomprehensible...This attack was excessive and unjust. You can't explain it to the Somali people or international community. Now people are very, very angry. There is a total divorce between the U.N. and Somali people. The Somali people feel now that it is an occupation force with a hidden agenda to take over the country. They don't feel U.N. troops have come to protect the humanitarian assistance."

Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian U.N. envoy to Somalia, commenting on the change in Somali attitudes towards UNOSOM[38]

Until Bloody Monday, members of the S.N.A/U.S.C believed that the U.N., in particular its Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had been manipulating the naïve Americans into supporting an imperialist Egyptian agenda under cover of a humanitarianism.[19][32] A few years earlier, Ghali had been an Egyptian diplomat that actively supported former President Siad Barre when the civil war had broken out (a war Aideed and his clan family mostly won), but the ambush wiped away any residual sympathy for American misunderstandings.[19] The S.N.A. would put out a bounty for any American soldier or U.N. personnel killed, and attacks against UNOSOM II forces would double in July and August 1993.[6][42]

“The problem is that now the UN operation is perceived by the Somalis as an occupation. The tension in the streets is high, people are afraid and aggressive...”

Pierre Gelas, a French aid worker commenting on the atmosphere in Mogadishu following Bloody Monday[62]

According to Robert Oakley the raid, "affected the Somali attitudes as much as the attack on Pakistanis had influenced attitudes with UNOSOM".[6][19] In the notes for Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden would find while researching the book that, "The attack still stirs up deep anger and bitterness among the Somalis from all walks of life I interviewed in Mogadishu."[63]