Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559)

The Italian Wars between Valois France and the Habsburg Empire began in 1494 and with intermittent breaks lasted for over 60 years. For much of this period, both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire were ruled by Emperor Charles V until he abdicated in January 1556 and divided his possessions. The lands of the Habsburg monarchy, often referred to as "Austria", went to his brother Ferdinand, who was also elected Holy Roman Emperor. His son Philip II of Spain was already ruler of the Spanish Netherlands, Milan and joint ruler of England through his marriage to Mary I in July 1554. He now became king of Spain, Naples, Sicily and its colonial possessions in South America.[2]

Partition of Habsburg dominions in 1556

This division reflected the administrative complexity of managing the two empires as a single entity but also differences in their strategic objectives. While Spain was a global maritime superpower, the Austrian Habsburgs focused on securing a pre-eminent position in Germany and managing the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire.[3] A second area of divergence was how to respond to the Reformation and growth of Protestantism. In Germany, conflict between Lutheran and Catholic princes resulted in the 1552 Second Schmalkaldic War, settled by the 1556 Peace of Augsburg.[4] Unlike Ferdinand, who favoured compromise with his Protestant subjects, Charles and his son Philip responded to the simultaneous rise of Calvinism in the Spanish Netherlands with repression, a policy that eventually led to the outbreak of the Dutch War of Independence in 1568.[5]

The two Habsburg branches continued to co-operate when their aims converged, not least because the Spanish army relied on German recruits.[6] However, Ferdinand focused on restoring order to the Empire and dealing with the threat posed by the Ottoman occupation of Hungary. Although Philip continued fighting, peace with France would enable him to deal with the rebellious Dutch while victories at St Quentin in 1577 and Gravelines in August 1558 allowed him to negotiate from strength.[7] Like his opponents, he was struggling to finance the war; in December 1558, he advised his commander in Flanders, Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, that he could no longer pay his troops.[8][lower-alpha 1]

Similar financial problems meant Henry II of France was also willing to reach an agreement. Faced by Habsburg territories on three of their frontiers (see Map), French objectives were to strengthen their borders and weaken their opponents. The former had been achieved by the occupation of the Three Bishoprics in 1552 and capture of Calais in January 1558, while dividing the Habsburg lands between Spain and Austria went some way to achieving the latter. In addition, internal divisions caused by the rise of Protestantism in France had exacerbated regional differences and factional splits within the nobility which led to the outbreak of the French Wars of Religion in 1562.[10] England was also anxious to end the war, which it entered in alliance with Spain and was widely seen as a disastrous decision.[11] The capture of Calais after more than 200 years severely damaged English prestige and deprived them of a bridgehead which had allowed English troops to intervene in mainland Europe with relative ease.[12]

Although peace talks between Spain, England and France began in early 1558, little progress was made since France refused to contemplate Mary's demand for the return of Calais and her marriage to Philip made it difficult for England to negotiate separately. Her death in November 1558 and the succession of her Protestant half-sister Elizabeth I of England changed this dynamic. The new regime needed peace and stability more than Calais, while France had leverage in the form of the 16 year old Catholic wife of the future Francis II of France, Mary, Queen of Scots, who also had a claim to the English throne.[lower-alpha 2][14]

This opened the possibility of a separate Anglo-French peace and in December a new English envoy, Nicholas Wotton, arrived in France to hold informal talks separate from those in Le Cateau. Since both sides recognised English security depended upon Philip's continued goodwill, finding a way to address this issue was crucial if they were to reach a deal.[15] Although Elizabeth continued to press for the return of Calais, she could not afford to continue fighting simply to achieve that objective and the French were well aware of that reality.[16]

Despite attempts to keep the negotiations secret, his spies kept Philip informed on their progress; although he disliked Elizabeth's religion, having the half-French Mary on the English throne would be far worse, even if she was a Catholic. If England was about to settle, it was vital that Spain should not be left isolated, especially as Philip admitted in February that his desperate financial position made it a matter of urgency.[17] While its involvement in the war was relatively minor, England played an important role in the negotiations that ended it, as did Emperor Ferdinand, whose approval was required since many of the territorial adjustments involved states that were members of the Holy Roman Empire.

During a tournament held to celebrate the peace on 1 July, Henry was injured in a Jousting accident and died ten days later. His 15-year-old son Francis II succeeded him before he too died in December 1560 and was replaced by his 10 year old brother Charles.[23] The resulting political instability, combined with the sudden demobilisation of thousands of largely unpaid troops, led to the outbreak of civil war in 1562 that would consume France for the next thirty years.[24]

All signatories of the treaty needed to 'purge their lands of heresy'; in other words, all their subjects had to be forcefully reverted to Catholicism. When pressured by Spain to implement this obligation, Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy proclaimed the Edict of Nice (15 February 1560), prohibiting Protestantism on pains of a large fine, enslavement or banishment, which soon led to an armed revolt by the Protestant Waldensians in his domain that would last until July 1561.[19]

For Spain, despite no new gains and the restoration of some occupied territories to France, the peace was a positive result by confirming its control of the Habsburg Netherlands, the Duchy of Milan, and the Kingdoms of Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily. Ferdinand I left the Three Bishoprics under French occupation, but the Netherlands and most of northern Italy remained part of the Holy Roman Empire in the form of imperial fiefs. Furthermore, his position of Holy Roman Emperor was recognized by the Pope, who had refused to do so as long as the war between France and the Habsburgs continued. England fared poorly during the war, and the loss of its last stronghold on the Continent damaged its reputation.[25]

At the end of the conflict, Italy was therefore divided between viceroyalties of the Spanish Habsburgs in the south and the formal fiefs of the Austrian Habsburgs in the north. The imperial states were ruled by the Medici in Tuscany, the Spanish Habsburgs in Milan, the Estensi in Modena, and the House of Savoy in Piedmont.[26] The Kingdoms of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia were under direct rule of the Spanish Habsburgs.

The situation continued until the European wars of succession of the 18th century, when northern Italy passed to the Austrian house of Habsburg-Lorraine, and southern Italy passed to the Spanish Bourbons.[27] The Papacy, in central Italy, maintained major cultural and political influence during the Catholic Reformation that was initiated by the conclusion of the Tridentine Council, which was resumed by the treaty's terms.[28]

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