Gerasimov doctrine

• Military measures of strategic deterrence
• Strategic deployment.
• Warfare.
• peacekeeping operations.

• Formation of coalitions and alliances.
• Political and diplomatic pressure.
• Economic sanctions
• Economic blockade
• Breakdown of diplomatic relations.
• Formation of political opposition.
• Action of opposition forces.
• Conversion of the economy of the country confronting Russia to the military rails.^{[Clarification needed]}
• Finding ways to resolve the conflict.
• Changing the political leadership of the country confronting Russia.
• Implementation of a set of measures to reduce tensions in relations after the change of political leadership.

In addition, the doctrine assumes "information confrontation," without specifying whether these activities are military or non-military.[11]

According to some experts,[17] its key elements are based on the historical roots of Russia's previous military doctrine and show a striking similarity to the provisions of China's "Unrestricted Warfare" doctrine, published in 1999. It is believed that this doctrine can be seen as a reinterpretation in the realities of the 21st century of the well-known concept of unconventional warfare, which in modern Russian military terminology are called "nonlinear".[17]

Within this framework, the main goal of "nonlinear warfare" is to achieve the desired strategic and geopolitical results, using a wide toolbox of non-military methods and means: explicit and covert diplomacy, economic pressure, winning the sympathy of the local population, etc.[17]

According to the U.S. military, the "Gerasimov Doctrine" represents the most complete embodiment of the latest achievements of Russian military thought in a new type of warfare, which demonstrates the unprecedented integration of all capabilities of national influence to achieve strategic advantages. Based on the discreteness of the idea of war, which was established in Russian culture by Leo Tolstoy's classic novel War and Peace, the Gerasimov doctrine has blurred the lines between the polarized states of "war" and "peace," introducing a kind of analog to the Western idea of an intermediate continuum or "gray zone". American analysts point out that the Russian military's use of the new developments surprisingly inverts some of the fundamental paradigms of armed confrontation that were laid down in the works of Carl von Clausewitz and have been considered immutable for centuries.[16]

For example, Clausewitz's description of war as a "continuation of politics, but by other means" no longer applies in the "Gerasimov doctrine" because it does not consider war as a continuation of politics, but politics as a continuation of war, emphasizing that the effective conduct of politics may involve a broader arsenal of non-military means and methods. Similarly, the Gerasimov Doctrine forces a reconsideration of several other important tenets, such as Clausewitz's military-theoretical understanding of the "centre of gravity" as a key point of effort.[16]

Western experts were particularly concerned by the apparent focus of the Russian "Gerasimov doctrine" on exploiting the weak links of the Western principle of managerial decision making, which is based on a system of checks and balances that implies exhaustive analysis of the situation, lengthy public discussion and extensive coordination of the efforts of various agencies (the State Department, the Department of Defense, etc.).

In contrast, the Russian model of governance, based on Gerasimov's ideas, seamlessly combines all the authoritative institutions, making coordination between them completely unencumbered. Their functioning is hidden from the outside observer by an impenetrable veil of secrecy, and the available tools use the applied achievements of Reflexive control, which allows the Russian authorities to act rigidly, flexibly and quickly, and not particularly distracted by such conventions as legality, legitimacy, etc..