Croatian Defence Council

As fighting spread in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992, the inhabitants of many Herzegovinian, central Bosnian and Bosnian Posavina's villages spontaneously formed so-called village guard formations to defend against possible JNA and VRS attack and growing criminal mischief. The village guards were local men who served on a volunteer basis, did not wear uniforms, and were armed with a hodgepodge of pistols, shotguns, hunting rifles, and old military weapons.[13] For the most part, the village guards were old men, boys, and the disabled, although some able-bodied men did participate when not otherwise engaged. The village guard formations were often multiethnic and included Croats, Muslims, and even some Serbs. Village guards elected their own leaders and served primarily as sentries and a weak reaction force in case of trouble. Although not officially a part of the HVO, the village guards formed a recruiting pool of potential volunteers for HVO military formations. Able-bodied members of the village guards often served voluntarily as members of the "shifts" manning the frontline against the VRS, and many of them were absorbed into the HVO brigades under the control of HQ and OZCB, during Muslim-Croat War in 1993. The HVO Home Guard organizations formed in 1993 assumed many of the village guards area defense functions.

The Operative Zones commanders relied on local leaders to organize groups of volunteers who agreed to serve repetitive shifts of seven to ten days in the front line against the VRS.[14] The shifts were controlled by HQ, OZ, and consisted of fifty to sixty men from a given area. The available military weapons were kept on the frontline position and transferred to the relieving shift. The men participating in the shifts were only skimpily supplied with uniforms and other equipment and were considered soldiers only during the time they were actually on shift. Shifts going on duty usually formed up a day or two in advance at some convenient location in their home locality, underwent some refresher training, drew additional equipment, and were then transported to the front line, where they relieved the shift that was on duty.[14] Given their limited manpower and armament, the HVO shifts were capable of only very limited local offensive action and were thus for the most part relegated to conducting a static defense in place against the VRS. During Muslim-Croat war on HVO frontline troops, many of the men who had volunteered previously for shift duty were incorporated in the HVO brigades.

Standard NATO Military Symbol for an infantry brigade

The core of the HVO’s military power consisted of brigades formed in late 1992 and early 1993. The brigades were reserve formations manned by part-time soldiers who, when not on duty, lived at home and pursued their civilian occupations. Compared to other HVO military elements, the men in the HVO brigades were relatively well-organized, well-armed, and well-equipped but were capable of only limited, local offensive action and were employed primarily to defend their home territory. With the onset of the Muslim-Croat conflict in January 1993, the HVO brigades became the mainstay of the Bosnian Croat defense forces and bore the brunt of the fighting against the ARBiH. The HVO brigades were territorially based and took their designation either from a historical personality or the area in which they were located, although some brigades were numerically designated. There were 38 infantry brigades staffed by reservists, 19 had names and/or numbers and 19 only had names. The names commemorated famous or infamous figures from Croatian and Bosnian history. Each brigade had three or four battalions plus supporting elements.

The organization of the HVO brigades was based on a modification of the old JNA Type "R" reserve brigade tables of organization and equipment and had a planned strength of 2,841 officers and enlisted men (OEM). However, the authorized strength of HVO tactical units was seldom achieved.[15] For example, in mid-May 1993, the Frankopan Brigade in the Guča Gora, Travnik area had an actual strength of only 1,376 OEM.[16] In the fall of 1993, the Vitez Brigade, with four battalions, was one of the larger HVO units, yet it could muster only 2,423 OEM—of whom 80 percent were home guardsmen.[17] In early February, 1994, at the very end of the Muslim-Croat conflict, the principal HVO units in the Lašva Valley enclave under the control of HQ, OZCB, included the Stephen Tomašević Brigade in Novi Travnik (1,981 OEM); the Vitez Brigade (2,909 OEM); the Nikola Šubić Zrinski Brigade in Busovača (2,238 OEM, plus another 1,429 men in the 3d Battalion in Fojnica); and remnants of the Frankopan Brigade (1,214 OEM), the Jure Francetić Brigade (57 OEM), and the Travnik Brigade (1,074 OEM).[18]

All of the institutions and norms of HVO were still in the formative stage, and there had been insufficient time to work out suitable regulations and standards, much less to impart them effectively to all personnel. A good deal of time is required to achieve consensus on institutional processes and norms and to insure that all members of the organization know the rules, accept them as valid, and act accordingly. That time was simply not available to the HVO.

Another factor serving to degrade command and control in the HVO was that army was composed predominantly of part-time "citizen" soldiers, who in effect served pretty much when and even where they pleased. Most units were composed of comrades from the same village, lower-level leaders were often elected, and command authority had to be earned. Many of the lower-level HVO commanders were not fully respected by their subordinates, their peers, or their superiors.[19] Moreover, particularly in the HVO, the part-time soldiers mixed civilian and military duties. When they were not on the frontlines against the Serbs, they were in their home villages pursuing their normal occupations, and the lack of barracks exacerbated the lack of discipline. The HVO soldiers were also prone to select for themselves the unit in which they wished to serve, requiring the commander of the HVO Vitez Brigade, for example, to issue a specific order forbidding "transfers from one unit to another on one’s own initiative."[20] Although common around the world, such part-time and “voluntary” military service under the command of one’s friends and neighbors is not conducive to the acceptance of strict discipline and accountability.

Logo of Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the party that won the most of Croatian votes on General and Municipal elections, held on 18th November 1990. and established Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, 18 November 1991.

If someone wanted to appoint a brigade commander, before doing anything else, the commander of the Operative Zone had to reach agreement with the municipal authorities and to come to an agreement as to the name of the person who would be proposed. When such agreement was reached, information about that commander would be submitted through the brigade commander to the commander of the Operative Zone and further on to the highest level, the president of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. After which, when all these steps were taken, a document would be drafted on the appointment of this commander. Throughout this chain, a key role was played by the political authorities in the municipality. Although there was certainly dissension in the higher levels of the Herzeg-Bosnia government and the HVO over matters of military policy, organization, and strategy, the principal point at which political influence affected the exercise of effective command and control by HVO military leaders was at the local level.[21]

The HVO special purpose unit (PPN) and military police (VP) posed special command and control problems for the commanders of the Operative Zones. Elements of these forces were often placed under the OZ commander’s operational control (OPCON), however, they remained under the HVO Department of Defense for administration and military justice.[22]

That is to say, the Operative Zone commander, could in theory assign operational tasks to OPCON VP and PPN units, but he could not dismiss or discipline their commanders. In practice, the OZ commander’s powers to task OPCON PPN, VP, and Security Information Service units were even more limited, and it was usually necessary to negotiate the assignment with their commanders before formally assigning tasks to their units. At the same time, the HVO Department of Defense could (and often did) task such units directly—with or without notifying the OZ commander in whose area of responsibility they might operate.

The HVO’s more than three thousand military policemen were organized in four (later eight) battalions, each of which had companies specializing in antiterrorist and assault operations, guarding headquarters and other key installations, traffic control, and investigating crimes committed by or upon military personnel. Given their status as a quasi-national police force and their direct participation in operations as assault troops, HVO VPs were more like a national gendermarie in both organization and function than a sole military police force. The HVO VP units reported directly to the VP office at the HVO Department of Defense headquarters in Mostar. Military police units were normally placed under the operational control of the Operative Zone commander, who could direct their operations but had no administrative or military justice powers over them. In mid-August, 1993, the Operative Zone commander was given full authority over the battalion and those military policemen attached to HVO brigades in the OZ answered to his brigade commanders.[1]

Flag of the Croatian Defence Forces

The principal paramilitary organization posing a control problem for HVO authorities was the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), the military arm of the ultra-right wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), which had branches in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[23] The HOS forces, dressed in black and sporting a variety of fascist insignia, included both Muslims and Croats and cooperated enthusiastically with the HVO and the ARBiH in the fight against the Bosnian Serbs.[24] The HOS headquarters was in Ljubuški, and its principal area of operations was in the southern areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Extremist in their orientation, HOS soldiers were responsible for numerous excesses, including the operation of notorious detention centers for Serb prisoners in Čapljina and Mostar.[23]

HVO authorities tolerated the unpredictable and unruly HOS forces for their value in fighting the Serb aggressors. Relations between the HVO and HOS soured quickly, however, after the HVO was implicated in the ambush and death of Blaž Kraljević, a HOS commander, and seven other HOS members at a police checkpoint in the village of Krusevo on August 9, 1992. Soon thereafter, HOS forces in western Herzegovina were disarmed by the HVO, and on August 23, HOS and HVO officials in Herzegovina agreed that the HOS would be absorbed by the HVO. The remaining HOS units were subsequently recognized by the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the ARBiH, as was the HVO. The HOS units in the area, along with their vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and other matériel, were integrated into the HVO and placed under the command of the HVO Brigades.

The state of general chaos engendered by the defensive war against the VRS, the internal conflicts in Bosnia, and the general availability of weapons significantly increased the opportunities and rewards for common criminal activity in the region, a factor that further degraded the HVO commanders’ ability to exercise effective command and control.[25] Croatian Defense Council authorities recognized the situation in a mid-1993 report, which noted:

The law and order situation in the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia has reflected the state of war on the greater part of its territory. Under such conditions we evaluate the law and order situation as exceptionally complex, since war operations bring in their train various phenomena such as theft and increase in all types of crime, fights, violent behaviour, the insulting and disparagement of law-enforcement officers, arguments, shooting with firearms in public places, etc.

— HZ HB, HVO, "Report on Activities", 21, KC Z1134.

The frequent "holdups" of UN and private humanitarian aid convoys passing through western Herzegovina and central Bosnia were a particular problem. Such crimes were often blamed on HVO military units when in fact they were the work of organized criminal gangs whose members may only coincidentally have been soldiers in one or the other army. Although, the HVO took some "official" action with respect to interference with the aid convoys, many of the incidents had nothing to do with actions authorized by Croat authorities.

Although many of the crimes of violence against persons and property were the actions of individuals, the most serious threat to law and order was posed by some of the smaller paramilitary groups. These heavily armed criminal gangs engaged in wholesale murder, robbery, arson, extortion, black marketeering, and other criminal activity and thus were almost impossible for HVO commanders to control. Among the most active Croat gangs operating in the area of Central Bosnia were the "Žuti" (Yellows) in Travnik, led by Žarko "Žuti" Andrić, and the "Maturice" and "Apostoli" (Apostols) gangs controlled by Ivica Rajić in the Kiseljak area.[26]

Perhaps the greatest impediment to effective command and control by either side was the lack of adequate communications.[27] Although HVO was equipped with a variety of communications equipment, including radios, telephones, facsimile machines, and computers (linked with radios in the so-called packet system), neither had such equipment in sufficient quantities, and neither could ensure the security of the communications means at their disposal. HVO had fairly effective electronic warfare units, and all of the available modes of communication were subject to interception and constant monitoring.

Thus, sensitive orders and information often could not be transmitted to subordinate elements. Moreover, maintenance deficiencies and enemy countermeasures often interrupted communications with higher headquarters, particularly for the HVO, which was surrounded and had to communicate by indirect means with the HVO Main Staff in Mostar. Achieving secure courier communications was seldom possible. Without reliable, secure communications, the HVO Operative Zone commanders could exercise effective command and control over their often-fractious subordinate units. Strict adherence to the established laws of land warfare was impossible under such circumstances, as the atrocities committed by Croatian Defence Council attest.

The difficulties with command, control, and communications systems in the HVO was in part the product of the low level of individual, unit and specialist training. Training and discipline were weak in army except in the elite special purpose and military police units whose personnel apparently received extra training, were better armed, and exhibited a higher level of discipline and cohesion. The short duration of the Muslim-Croat conflict and the short existence of the HVO, compounded by the exigencies of the war against the Bosnian Serb army, made the attainment of a high level of individual, unit, and specialist training all but impossible. Nevertheless, the HVO attempted to provide at least rudimentary individual combat training for all personnel, and in some cases were able to offer officer training courses, specialist courses for engineers and snipers, and other forms of formal training. The HVO published formal training schedules, although they seem to have been more a reflection of what commanders hoped would happen than they were realistic plans that could be and were actually carried out. Both sides also appear to have given their troops instruction in the laws of land warfare. For example, a leaflet on the subject prepared by the Croatian Red Cross was distributed to the HVO units.[28]

Few officers in the HVO had been career officers in the Yugoslav People's Army or had received training adequate for the level of their posting. Indeed, there were minority officers who had any additional training to qualify them for the positions they held in the HVO.[29] However, quite a few officers in organization had undergone training as reserve officers and noncommissioned officers in the JNA and then went on to serve in the JNA Territorial Defense structure for several years.[30] In most cases, that training and experience barely qualified them for duty as a captain first class or as a company commander.

Emblem of the Territorial Defense Forces in SFRY

The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia relied on a national defense policy closely modeled on the Communist Chinese concept of "people's war".[31] The JNA’s defense policy and military doctrine focused on defending against an invasion by either NATO or Warsaw Pact forces and thus stressed the mobilization of the entire population. In the event of an invasion of Yugoslavian territory, the policy envisaged the conduct of a "total defensive battle [that] would involve all the forces of the nation, the entire population, and all aspects and material resources of the society".[32] Accordingly, Yugoslavian defensive military doctrine was based on a relatively small but well-equipped national army (the JNA) whose job was to delay an invader by engaging him in conventional combined arms operations while the larger Yugoslavian Territorial Defense forces were mobilized. The TO forces would operate in conjunction with the JNA until the latter’s combat power was exhausted. At that point, the TO would assume responsibility for largescale guerrilla operations throughout the country to defeat and eject the invader. This doctrine was adapted in one form or another by all three warring factions during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The keystone of Yugoslavia's defense doctrine was the Territorial Defense force, which was destined to carry the battle through to its successful conclusion. The TO forces were organized into mobile, brigade-size elements designed to operate over wide areas and local regional forces designed to protect their home territory. Territorial Defense forces were equipped and trained to fight with light antitank and air defense weapons as well as mortars and machine guns. Finally, they were designed to operate in a decentralized and independent manner, and although organized in brigade strength, they were trained to fight in company-size or smaller units. The JNA’s maneuver concepts were focused almost exclusively on what Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini called the "Grand Tactical Level of Battle".[33] They were, in fact, a blend of Soviet operational and tactical concepts and methods (for example, the use of special operations forces to degrade the enemy’s command and control capabilities and heavy reliance on artillery firepower in both the offense and defense) with those of the US Army (for example, the "active defense"). To these were added uniquely Yugoslavian elements based on their own combat experience and exercises and combining the use of regular, partisan, and irregular TO forces. Inasmuch as the JNA’s defense doctrine envisioned a rather short period of conventional warfare followed by an extended guerrilla campaign, emphasis was placed on the conduct of both large- and small-scale guerrilla raids, ambushes, and terrorist actions throughout enemy-held territory. Consequently, territorial defense personnel received a good deal of training in small-unit tactics, special operations, and the employment of snipers—all of which figured prominently in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The JNA’s doctrine also emphasized the use of checkpoints to control movement along important lines of communications. Sited on or near key terrain features, natural choke points, and the front lines, checkpoints featured the use of antitank and antipersonnel mines laid on both sides of the roadway, antitank mines laid on the surface of the roadway (for easy removal in order to permit friendly vehicles to pass through), iron tetrahedron obstacles, concertina barbed wire, and light antitank weapons and machine guns. Usually manned by up to ten men, such checkpoints could also be used to extort fees for passage. Both sides in central Bosnia employed checkpoints as an important operational method. Even the elderly civilian inhabitants of some villages along the main supply routes found that the establishment of a checkpoint could provide a lucrative source of income, and such unofficial "geezer" checkpoints were common.

Emblem of Croatian National Guard (ZNG), which was officially renamed to the Croatian Army (HV) on November 3, 1991

Although not involving a direct command and control problem for the Operative Zone Central Bosnia commander, the issue of whether or not HV forces operated in central Bosnia was of great political and legal significance. Although it is quite clear that the HVO in central Bosnia benefited directly from the logistical support provided by Croatia and may have benefited indirectly from the intervention of HV units in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the actual presence of HV combatants in central Bosnia remains unproved. Despite persistent rumors, the accusations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim-led government and of Muslim witnesses before the ICTY, a great deal of speculation on the part of UNPROFOR and ECMM observers, and a straightforward statement by the UN Security Council, there is, in fact, no convincing public evidence conclusively proving that the Croatian Army ever intervened in the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. Those making such allegations generally fail to make two key distinctions: first, between the HVO/ARBiH fight against the VRS and the Muslim-Croat conflict; and second, between the situation in central Bosnia and the situation elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What may have been true in one conflict or location was not necessarily true in another.

Peacekeeping force officers and ECMM monitors were prone to see an HV soldier in every foxhole and an HV tank battalion around every curve in the road. In fact, their bases for making such assertions were ridiculously thin: secondhand reports from Muslim authorities; an encounter at the HVO headquarters in Novi Travnik with an obnoxious young major who "was alleged to be" a Croatian officer; an HVO order to report any HV officers or men in the ranks of HVO units; the wearing of HV uniforms and insignia by Bosnian Croat veterans of the war in Croatia; and the questionable judgment that "the HVO couldn’t have done it on their own".For the alleged HV major in Novi Travnik, see Stewart, Blaskic trial testimony, June 18, 1998.[34] The latter speculation was particularly specious:

HVO forces have, during the past four months, proved capable of mounting military operations well inside the Bosnian Serb/Croat front-line with a strength and subsequent success which would have been unlikely had they been alone in their struggle. Indeed, the HVO have been involved in sustained combat with two foes and have managed to make gains against Moslem BiH forces while still being able to resist strong, competent and persistent Serb offensives. With such an extended front-line with the Serbs and limited resources in manpower, equipment and munitions, their effort has been supreme.

— ECMM Regional Center Zenica to HQ, ECMM, Zenica, 2332, June 3, 1993, subj: Report-HV Involvement in BH, 1, KC Z1012.

A formal accusation by the UN Secretary General was of greater moment. On February 1, 1994, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally notified the Security Council that, based on UNPROFOR reports, "the Croatian Army has directly supported the HVO in terms of manpower, equipment and weapons for some time", and that the UNPROFOR estimated that, as of the date of the report, the Croatian Army had the equivalent of three brigades (some three thousand to five thousand men) of regular HV personnel in "central and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina".[35] Yet, one must ask where the secretary general got his information. It could only have been from UNPROFOR observers on the ground or from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim-led government, which, once conflict had broken out between Muslims and Croats, had a vested interest in blaming the situation on Croatian intervention. In any event, what constituted HV intervention? A few HVO soldiers wearing old HV uniforms and insignia, or a thousand-man HV brigade with all its authorized weapons and vehicles? The former there were aplenty; the latter existed in central Bosnia only in the imagination of some overwrought observers.

In an undated statement signed by Hadžo Efendić, the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina charged that the government of Croatia had "openly supported ‘unlawful’ actions of the HVO in Mostar and Central Bosnia" and that "reliable information" indicated that there were two units of the regular Croatian military establishment "in the Lasva region": the 114th Split Brigade and the 123rd Varaždin Brigade.[36] The presence of the two HV units was never confirmed, and even the ECMM acknowledged that "the many reports [of HV involvement in BiH] provided by the BiH Armija have seldom been confirmed by ECMM, UNMOs or UNPROFOR".[37]

On June 11, 1993, Mate Granić, the Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, stated that Croatia had no armed formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and shortly thereafter Major General Slobodan Praljak of the Croatian Ministry of Defense formally acknowledged that Croatia had provided logistical support to the HVO but denied HV combat forces had any direct involvement in the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. Senior HVO officers in central Bosnia also consistently denied under oath that HV forces were ever present or took part in the Muslim-Croat conflict there.[38] Under questioning by a member of the Trial Chamber in the Blaškić trial, even Colonel Bob Stewart (British Army officer) acknowledged that "generally BRITBAT did not believe there was any HV presence in Central Bosnia," and the UNPROFOR chief of staff, Lieutenant General Sir Roddy Cordy-Simpson, also stated that UNPROFOR had not confirmed such reports and that he personally had never seen any HV troops in the Kiseljak area.[39]

National battalions in UN Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, early 1993

UN Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 1995

The UNPROFOR units operating within the boundaries of the HVO Operative Zones included British infantry battalions stationed in Nova Bila, near Travnik, the Dutch/Belgian transportion battalion in Busovača, Spanish battalion in Međugorje, near Mostar, and the UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina Command headquarters (HQ, BHC) in Kiseljak.[40] Three reinforced British infantry battalions served successive six-month tours as the principal UNPROFOR force in the Lašva Valley.[41] Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart’s 1st Battalion, 22d (Cheshire) Infantry Regiment, arrived from Germany in October, 1992, and established the British battalion (BRITBAT) base in the school at Nova Bila just off the main route through the Lašva Valley. The Cheshires deployed one company in Gornji Vakuf and the HQ and remaining three companies at Nova Bila and immediately began to use their Warrior armored vehicles to protect the humanitarian aid convoys transiting the area.[42] The Cheshires were relieved in May, 1993, by the 1st Battalion, Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alastair Duncan.[43] The Prince of Wales’s Own was replaced in November, 1993, by the 1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter G. Williams.[44]

The UNPROFOR Dutch/Belgian transportion battalion at Busovača was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Johannes de Boer from November, 1992, to April, 1993, and by Lieutenant colonel Paulus Schipper from April to November, 1993.[45] The battalion had the mission of providing transportation support for UNHCR humanitarian convoys and for UNPROFOR units in central Bosnia. Spanish Legion formed the Spanish Battalion of UNPROFOR and acted in Herzegovina, based in Mostar and Međugorje. The battalion had the mission of providing transportation support for UNHCR humanitarian convoys and for UNPROFOR units. The Nordic Battalion also operated in the Vareš area, while French Battalion operated in Tomislavgrad.

The UNPROFOR forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been criticized for their general lack of training, discipline, and suitable equipment, as well as a poorly conceived mission statement.[46] Confined mainly to protecting the aid convoys, and later the United Nations Safe Areas, UNPROFOR units were continually frustrated by restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) that prohibited them from actually intervening to prevent or stop the fighting or offenses against civilians. Even so, they established roadblocks and checkpoints, frequently interfered in on-going operations, and even fired upon Bosnian forces from time to time.[47]

Croatian Defense Council commanders complained bitterly of UNPROFOR bias in favor of the Muslims, charging that UNPROFOR was being deceived by the high proportion of Muslim interpreters they employed and that UNPROFOR personnel supplied arms and ammunition to the ARBiH, facilitated the movement of ARBiH combat forces in UNPROFOR vehicles, discriminated against the Croats in the movement of wounded soldiers and civilians to hospital, and revealed HVO plans to the ARBiH.[48] On the surface, however, UNPROFOR commanders tried to maintain good relations with both Muslims and Croats, and they worked diligently to broker and oversee cease-fires and to reduce the level of violence in the area.

Although unarmed and fewer in number, the ECMM teams in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a much greater nuisance, particularly to HVO commanders, than were the UNPROFOR soldiers. The ECMM was established to oversee the cease-fire provisions of the Brioni Agreement of July 9, 1991, which ended the hostilities in Slovenia. The first group of ECMM monitors arrived in Slovenia on July 15, 1991, and the EC monitoring program was subsequently extended into Croatia and then, in late 1992, into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The ECMM in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was managed from a Regional Center in Zenica with Coordinating Centers at Travnik, Tuzla and Mostar. The actual monitoring work was done by teams composed of two monitors, usually military officers seconded to the ECMM for a six-month tour from one of the EC or Conference on Security and Confidence Building in Europe (CSCE) countries, an interpreter, and a driver. The function of the monitoring teams was to patrol their assigned area and observe ongoing activities; maintain contact with local civil and military authorities as well as local and international aid agencies; facilitate and monitor cease-fire arrangements; investigate serious incidents and human rights violations; and encourage the improvement of relations between the warring parties. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the ECMM monitors in central Bosnia generally favored the Muslims, even to the extent of minimizing Croat charges of "ethnic cleansing" by the Muslims and accusing the HVO of using women and children to rob UN aid convoys.[49] Given their known biases, the HVO did not trust ECMM monitors, and they were not well received in areas controlled by HVO commanders. As a result, there were frequent incidents in which ECMM monitors were threatened by HVO troops and denied access to certain areas. In turn, the monitors were quick to blame the HVO for any incidents that occurred.

Emblem of Home Guard

To supplement the organized HVO brigades’ slender resources, in early 1993 the HZ HB government established a Home Guard (HD) organization.[51] This territorially based defense force was intended to provide support for the "regular" HVO forces and to provide armed control of territory; protect areas and facilities of special significance to the defense of HVO territory, such as reservoirs and waterworks, power plants, telecommunications facilities, hospitals, factories for the production of food and military goods, and vital storage facilities; to fight infiltrating sabotageterrorist groups; counter enemy air strikes; secure law and order; and prevent any activity aimed at undermining the defense system.[52]

Each municipality in Herzeg-Bosnia was ordered to establish an HD command by February 10, 1993, with the mobilization and organization of units to follow. Home Guard companies were to be set up in municipalities with few or no facilities of special significance, HD battalions in municipalities near the frontlines with the VRS or with a large number of special facilities, and an HD regiment in Mostar. An assistant chief of the HVO General Staff in Mostar was appointed to oversee HD activities, and each OZ was instructed to appoint an assistant commander for HD affairs. Home Guard units within a given Operative Zone were to be subordinate to the OZ commander, and in effect provided the extant HVO military forces with a reserve.

The exigencies of the Muslim-Croat conflict in 1993 precluded completion of the organization of the Home Guard. Following the conflict’s end in February, 1994, and the subsequent creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation Army, the existing HVO brigades were redesignated as Home Guard regiments. At the same time, the HVO set up a new General Staff Mobile Command to control the newly formed "professional" guards brigades. The General Staff Mobile Command had its headquarters at Capljina and consisted of the 1st Guards Brigade Ante Bruno Bušić (Čapljina), 2d Guards Brigade (Helidrom Mostar), 3d Guards Brigade Hawks (Vitez), 4th Guards Brigade Sons of Posavina (Orašje), 116th Special Forces (PPN) Battalion Ludvig Pavlović (Čapljina), and the 56th HD Regiment (Konjic). The Guards brigades were the sections of the HVO which handled the militia's heavy weapons. The HVO had around 50 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 200 armored troop carriers.

The four OZ's were designated as Military Districts Mostar, Tomislavgrad, Vitez and Orašje. Orašje included a much reduced Bosanska Posavina. Four Guards Brigades were formed, each manned by full-time professional soldiers. 29 brigades were reformed as three-battalion strong Home Guard Regiments (domobranska pukovnija), usually with the same name and depot. Travnik, Vitez, Second Zenica and Kotromanić Brigade were disbanded, while Brigade Jure Francetić became 44th Home Guard Battalion Jure Francetić.

95th Home Guard Regiment Kreševo, 201st and 202nd Home Guard Regiments in Posavina were established. The military police were reduced to one Light Assault Brigade at Mostar. First Croatian Battalion became 101st Home Guard Regiment Bihać, 107th Brigade Gradačac and 108th Brigade Brčko served with the ARBiH while two HVO brigades were forcibly incorporated into the ARBiH. The 115th Brigade Zrinski Tuzla became part of the ARBiH 2nd Corps while the King Tvrtko Brigade Sarajevo became part of the ARBiH 1st Corps.

In 1990, the SFRY not only purchased arms from many other nations, it was one of the world’s leading arms exporters to Third World countries. Yugoslavian military factories produced a full range of weapons: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, multiple-barrel rocket launchers, and mortars, as well as a wide range of other military equipment and supplies.[53] Consequently, the principal source of arms, ammunition, and other military equipment for both the HVO and the ARBiH was the system of arsenals and depots operated by the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although Alija Izetbegović allowed the JNA to disarm the existing TO forces in 1991–92, and the JNA subsequently contrived to hand over those weapons as well as the bulk of its other arms and equipment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Bosnian Serbs, both the HVO and ARBiH were able to obtain enormous quantities of matériel by raiding or outright seizing the remaining JNA stockpiles. Indeed, during the course of 1992, several armed squabbles between the Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia arose over the distribution of that booty. Yet, for the most part, the HVO and ARBiH shared the available equipment and supplies equally, just as they did the remaining weapons coming from the Bratstvo factory in Novi Travnik in December, 1992. According to one authority, of twenty-four D-30J 122-mm howitzers produced by the Bratstvo plant, the ARBiH obtained twelve and the HVO obtained twelve, of which only one remained in central Bosnia; and, of eighteen M-84AB 152-mm NORA gun-howitzers produced by the Bratstvo facility, the ARBiH obtained nine and the HVO obtained nine, of which only two remained in central Bosnia.[54] During the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia in 1993, the ARBiH had a clear advantage over the HVO in arms, ammunition, and other equipment.[55]

The majority of the military production facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the Lašva Valley or arrayed on its periphery.[56] All had been established by the JNA before Yugoslavia disintegrated and they formed a military industrial chain, most of which was concentrated in central Bosnia. For the most part, these plants for the manufacturing of war matériel fell into the ARBiH’s hands in 1991 and 1992, but the most important of them remained in the HVO’s hands throughout the period.

The most important of the military production facilities in central Bosnia was the Slobodan Princip Seljo (SPS) factory in Vitez. The SPS factory manufactured military explosives essential for the production of mortar and artillery shells. It was the only such manufacturing facility in the Balkans, and it was the only important military production facility controlled by the HVO forces. The Vitez explosives factory, located just west of the town in a draw flanked by the villages of Donja Večeriska and Gaćice and mostly underground, was the key to the entire chain of military production in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without it, the other arms manufacturing facilities were largely useless.

The importance of the SPS explosives factory to the ARBiH was signaled during talks in Bonn, Germany, between President Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Franjo Tuđman of Croatia in January, 1993. In a message to the UN secretary general, negotiator Thorvald Stoltenberg noted:

In the talks he had with Tuđman in our presence, Izetbegović insisted the Croats must leave Vitez because it had an ammunition plant that the Muslims must have. Tuđman replied that the Muslims will never have the plant and will never be able to take Vitez militarily. However, if they did, the plant would be blown up.

— Thorvald Stoltenberg to the UN secretary general, Jan. 9, 1993, message, subject: Talks in Bonn, KC Z354.1.

Although the SPS explosives plant was the main objective of ARBiH offensives in the Lašva Valley throughout 1993, it was never taken and remained in the HVO’s hands at the time of the Washington Agreement, in February, 1994. The HVO internally produced some of the arms and equipment they needed. The HVO produced various types of ammunition as well as some improvised weapons such as the infamous "Bebe" (Babies): a kind of bomb launcher, the ammunition for which was manufactured from fire extinguisher canisters.[57] Even refrigerators were turned into improvised mines.[58]

  Republic of Croatia

  Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia

Despite the UN arms embargo, the both HVO and the ARBiH obtained substantial quantities of arms, ammunition, and other military supplies from abroad. Some of it was obtained on the international black market, but the Republic of Croatia also supplied considerable amounts of arms, ammunition, and other equipment items to both sides.[59] Almost all of this matériel had to be funneled through Croatia, which thus controlled the types and amounts reaching the two forces in conflict in central Bosnia.[60] That the Croatian government allowed any military supplies at all to pass through Croatia for the ARBiH can be attributed to their belief that it would be used against the Serbs, who continued to threaten Croatia as well. In some cases, the Croatian government refused to permit the transit of arms for the ARBiH. For example, in September, 1992, Croatian officials discovered and confiscated some four thousand weapons and a million rounds of ammunition aboard an Iranian aircraft in Zagreb.[61] The aircraft was ostensibly delivering humanitarian supplies.

The transit of arms for the ARBiH through Croatia is not consistent with the theory that Croatia planned to carry out an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Bosnian Muslims. Nor is it consistent with an alleged deal between Croatia and Serbia to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between them. One of the most curious aspects of the Muslim-Croat conflict is the degree to which both sides communicated with each other and continued to cooperate in the common struggle against the Bosnian Serb army. Even at the height of the internal struggle in 1993, the ARBiH requested, and the HVO approved, the movement of weapons and ammunition through the areas controlled by the HVO to areas threatened by the Serbs.[62] Moreover, many leaders in Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim-led government, including President Izetbegović himself, parked their families in the relative safety of Zagreb to avoid the wartime dangers of Sarajevo. That the Croatian government and the HVO would permit such activities is scarcely consistent with the policy of separatism, persecution, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and wanton murder, rape, and destruction charged against HVO leaders.

The transfer of arms, ammunition, and other military supplies from Croatia to the HVO and ARBiH, as well as the transit of war matériel purchased on the international arms market through Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina violated the UN arms embargo. There was also a three-way black market that dealt in armaments and civilian consumer goods within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Both the HVO and the ARBiH obtained small but often significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from the VRS, and both the HVO and the ARBiH also benefited from illegal black market arrangements with UNPROFOR personnel. For example, the Ukrainian UNPROFOR unit in Sarajevo did a brisk trade with the HVO in the Kiseljak area, French UNPROFOR engineers supplied the ABiH with fuel, and the Dutch/Belgian UNPROFOR transport battalion in Busovača sold fuel to the HVO.[63]

During the Bosnian War, central Bosnia could be reached from the Dalmatian coast and Herzegovina to the south by five routes, all except one of which passed through Jablanica, Jablanica.[64] From Split, the principal port of entry for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main route for all traffic to Jablanica (Route CIRCLE) ran via Brnaze and Kamensko to Tomislavgrad and thence to Mandino Selo. From Mandino Selo the main road continued to Jablanica and thence to Prozor (Route SQUARE), but it was also possible to go directly from Mandino Selo to Prozor (Route TRIANGLE). The easternmost (Konjic – Hadžići – Sarajevo – Visoko and westernmost (Bugojno – Donji Vakuf – Turbe – Travnik) routes from Jablanica into central Bosnia were both in the VRS’s hands for most of the period under consideration and were thus not available to the HVO.

Roads in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The route from Jablanica through Bugojno via Reput to Novi Travnik was apparently little used even before the ARBiH took Bugojno thereby closing that route to the HVO altogether. Once the ARBiH took Konjic, a significant portion of the route from Jablanica via Konjic, Kreševo, Kiseljak, Busovača, Kaonik to the Putićevo intersection (Route PACMAN) was also denied to the HVO, which in turn blocked the road south of Kreševo thereby denying its use to the ARBiH as well. Thus, the route from Jablanica via Gornji Vakuf and Reput through Novi Travnik to the Putićevo intersection with the road running down the Lašva Valley (Route DIAMOND) was the main supply route from Herzegovina to central Bosnia over which flowed the bulk of UN relief cargo as well as a small amount of commercial traffic. It was also the principal resupply route for UNPROFOR forces, and the British Royal Engineers improved and maintained it during the entire period.[65] From April 14, 1993, neither the ARBiH nor the HVO had free use of this critical LOC because each held various segments of its length. The HVO held the termini at Gornji Vakuf and Novi Travnik, and the ARBiH held the center section.

During the course of the Croat-Muslim conflict in central Bosnia, the HVO constructed a number of alternative "war roads" to replace routes lost to the enemy or unusable because they were under direct observation and fire from the other side. The HVO built two such routes into the Lašva Valley from the south. The first ran from Prozor to Gornji Vakuf and then across the mountains to Fojnica. Called the "Road of Hope" by the HVO, this road was known to UNPROFOR as Route SALMON. Another HVO resupply route ran from Gornji Vakuf over the hills northeast to Sebešić, where it split— one path continuing on to Vitez and another to Busovača. Not suitable for vehicular traffic, the HVO used this route primarily to move essential supplies on horses and mules.

The main route through the Lašva Valley itself was used extensively during the war, but because it was vulnerable to attack from the hills north of the road, the HVO built a war road on the south side of the Lašva River running from Novi Travnik via Vitez to Busovača. Despite sustained attempts by the ARBiH to interdict it, this route remained open to HVO vehicular traffic from Vitez to Busovača. The HVO constructed numerous other local war roads because they were needed to support particular locations and operations.

Croatian helicopters operated from Split to Central Bosnia, from 1993 to 1994

The HVO Air Force and Anti-aircraft Artillery was formed in 1992 and consisted of the 11th Combined Squadron, operated helicopters and transports, and the 121st Observation Squadron which operated various civilian light aircraft in an observation and communications role. There was also the 14th Anti-aircraft Missile Unit which operated several different SAM systems.

Despite UN restrictions, both the HVO limited use of helicopters for medical evacuation and resupply. United Nations Security Council Resolution 816, issued on March 31, 1993, banned flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina by all fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. This no-fly zone was subsequently enforced by NATO aircraft in Operation Deny Flight, which lasted from April 12, 1993, until December 20, 1995. However, stopping unauthorized helicopter flights was extremely difficult, and between November, 1992, and July, 1995, UN authorities recorded over fifty-seven hundred violations of the flight ban.[66]

For the HVO, the use of helicopters to evacuate casualties and to bring in even small quantities of medical supplies, repair parts, and other critical items was a very important, if limited, part of the logistical chain. Prior to the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict, HVO forces in central Bosnia were relatively well supplied by road from HVO logistical bases at Grude and Posušje in Herzegovina. With the ARBiH attacks in April, 1993, the main land lines of communication to the south, Route DIAMOND in particular, could no longer be used to evacuate casualties from central Bosnia or to bring in supplies. The need for casualty evacuation was critical, and Drago Nakić, a manager of the SPS explosives firm stationed in Split, arranged and coordinated the legal use of Croatian Army helicopters for the evacuation of casualties from the HVO hospital in Nova Bila.[67]

The HV helicopters operated from their base in Divulje under UNPROFOR and ECMM supervision, but their use was discontinued in July, 1993, due to the danger arising from heavier ABiH attacks and the shrinking of the Lašva Valley pocket. Nakić then arranged for the use of commercial helicopters with Russian and Ukrainian civilian crews to make the flights from Grude and Posušje and the evacuation flights continued at a rate of two or three per week until early 1994.[68]

Although authorized helicopter flights brought in some medical supplies for the HVO in central Bosnia until July, 1993, for all practical purposes the Operative Zone Central Bosnia was entirely cut off from Herzegovina from early July until the fall of 1993, and no significant amounts of military supplies were received.[69] However, the unauthorized commercial helicopter flights from Grude and Posušje did bring in limited amounts of critical items, such as ammunition, spare parts, and communications equipment, and there may well have been other unauthorized parachute drops and helicopter deliveries.[70]

Thus, while the HVO forces in Herzegovina may have been well equipped with tanks, artillery, food, fuel, clothing, ammunition, and other supplies provided by the Republic of Croatia and other outside sources, the situation in central Bosnia was vastly different. The HVO in central Bosnia was not only outnumbered, it was outgunned as well. As the conflict dragged on, the HVO’s logistical situation became even worse, despite attempts to open alternate lines of communication and the use of helicopters. The measure of the HVO’s resources poverty is that at the time of the Washington Agreement cease-fire in February, 1994, the on-hand stocks of artillery ammunition in the OZCB had fallen to six 122-mm shells and four 155-mm shells.

In Central Bosnia, the ARBiH appears to have had a significant advantage in armor and artillery. The ARBiH III Corps had at least six tanks incorporated in the 301st Mechanized Brigade, and although there were rumors that the HVO had eight tanks in the Maglaj salient and another nine in the Kiseljak area, there appear to have been no HVO tanks in the critical Travnik-Vitez-Busovača enclaves.[71] With respect to artillery, the ARBiH actually surpassed the HVO in mortars (60-mm and 120-mm) and artillery (122-mm and 155-mm). The Muslim forces also had 128-mm multiple-barrel rocket launchers, although they lacked ammunition. During the fighting in April and June, 1993, the ABiH III Corps was supported by a hundred 120-mm mortars; ten 105-mm, 122-mm, and 155-mm howitzers; eight to ten antiaircraft guns; twenty-five to thirty antiaircraft machine guns; two or three tanks; and two or three ZIS 76-mm armored weapons.[72] The relative strength of the ARBiH and HVO forces in the Busovača, Novi Travnik, Travnik, and Vitez area noting the artillery and armor holdings shown in table.[73]

The correlation of forces with respect to manpower was somewhat less favorable to the HVO in central Bosnia. The HVO's estimates place the comparative strengths of the two forces in the spring of 1993 at 8.000–8.200 for the HVO Operative Zone Central Bosnia (OZCB) to 82.000–84.000 for the ARBiH III Corps, a ratio of more than 10:1 in favor of the ARBiH.[80] However, the actual disproportion was probably considerably less. In fact, the ARBiH III Corps's headquarters (HQ), reported in 1997 that its authorized strength during the period November, 1992, to April, 1993, was approximately 26,182 officers and men.[81] As noted above, the OZCB's ration strength was 8,750 on February 23, 1993. Using those figures, a quick calculation yields a ratio of about 3:1 in favor of the ARBiH. Although the HVO was able to muster favorable force ratios on a local basis, the ARBiH III Corps had a significant advantage in manpower resources throughout the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. The III Corps area of operations was larger than that of the HVO OZCB, and some III Corps units were deployed against HVO forces in Operative Zone Northwestern Herzegovina. On the other hand, troops from those units, as well as Muslim forces from the other ARBiH corps areas (particularly the I, VI, and VII Corps) were frequently deployed against the HVO in central Bosnia. Nonetheless, HQ, OZCB, could still muster near equivalence with III Corps on a place-by-place basis at various times. For example, in February, 1993, HQ, OZCB, reported ratios of forces in contact in the Busovača area as 1.500 ARBiH to 1.395 HVO (1,1:1); in the Novi Travnik area as 1.800 ARBiH to 1.160 HVO (1,6:1); in the Travnik area as 4,000 ARBiH to 1,701 HVO (2,4:1); and in the Vitez area as 2.000 ARBiH to 2.279 HVO (1:1,2).[82] However, such favorable force ratios are apt to be misleading in that the reserves not in contact available to the ARBiH III Corps were substantial, whereas the HVO was fully committed.

As time went on, the basic disproportion grew in favor of the Muslims as the ARBiH increased in strength while the HVO forces in central Bosnia declined in number due to casualties and other losses. While the HVO was unable to find replacements, the ARBiH was constantly being augmented by the influx of large numbers of Muslim refugees entering central Bosnia after having been expelled from eastern Bosnia and the Krajina by the VRS. For example, at the end of 1992, some twenty thousand Muslim refugees from the Jajce area settled in central Bosnia, providing a large number of well-motivated military-age men to fill out ARBiH units and create several new, mobile brigades that could be used for offensive operations outside a given territorial home base. Despite the lack of HVO manpower throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly in central Bosnia, the Croatian Defense Council's headquarters in Mostar did not declare full mobilization until June 10, 1993.[83]

In light of the later Muslim-Croat conflict, a good deal of controversy has arisen as to the exact proportion of effort dedicated to the defense against the VRS applied by the HVO and the ARBiH, particularly on the western front, first in the Jajce area, and after the fall of Jajce on October 30, 1992, in the Turbe-Travnik area. Croatian Defense Council authorities have charged that the Muslims refused to participate fully on the front lines against the Serbs in part because they were focused on organizing, arming, and training the forces needed to pursue their strategic plan for an offensive to clear the Bosnian Croats from central Bosnia.[84] For their part, the Muslims made similar accusations against the HVO and also accused the HVO of abandoning the fight against the Serbs altogether, at Jajce and elsewhere.[85]

Neither the HVO's claims nor those of the ARBiH are entirely correct or entirely wrong. In 1993, the greater portion of the ARBiH forces in central Bosnia deployed against the VRS were stationed on the Visoko-Sarajevo front, while the HVO forces deployed against the VRS were stationed primarily on the Turbe-Travnik front.[86] However, a substantial portion of the ABiH III Corps was deployed in positions surrounding the Croat enclaves in the Travnik-Novi Travnik-Vitez-Busovača-Kiseljak area, far from the VRS's front lines. As for Muslim charges that the Croats abandoned the line against the Serbs at Jajce and elsewhere, it is true that HVO forces in Jajce in October, 1992, recognized that the town was on the verge of falling to the VRS and withdrew first. However, HVO forces on the Turbe-Travnik line did not abandon their positions to the VRS in June, 1993, as the Muslims have charged. In fact, they were attacked from the rear by the ARBiH and forced to abandon their positions and flee across the front lines into the hands of the VRS.[87]

The actual number of troops stationed on the Travnik front by the HVO and the ARBiH at any given time in 1992 and 1993 varied from day to day, and the proportion of the defense provided by each force cannot be determined with any accuracy. Brigadier Ivica Zeko, the former HQ, OZCB, intelligence officer, said that until April, 1993, the ARBiH III Corps, with some 80,000 troops at its disposal—put only a minuscule number, some 1.500–1.700 men, in the lines against the VRS in the Travnik area, but added that there was not really much room on the front for many more Muslim troops.[88] Meanwhile, another HVO veteran of the fighting on the Travnik front noted that by April, 1993, the HVO had one three-battalion brigade and one two-battalion brigade, a total of some 2.500–3.000 men, on line, whereas the ABiH had two local brigades (the 306th and 312th Mountain Brigades), the 1st and 17th Krajina Mountain Brigades, and elements of the 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade on the Travnik line under the control of General Mehmed Alagić.[89]

Assuming that the ARBiH brigades were manned at roughly the same level as the HVO's, the total number of Muslim soldiers in the Travnik defenses would have been at least eight thousand to ten thousand. In any event, the one thing the ABiH had plenty of was manpower, and the number of men available to the commander of the ABiH III Corps were sufficient to man the Muslim portion of the Travnik defense line while simultaneously undertaking a program for the organization, arming, and training of mobile forces for a possible offensive against the Croats in central Bosnia.